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A nation that is boyc otted is a nation that is in sight of surrender . Apply this
economic, pea cefid, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force .
It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressur e
upon the nation which, in my judgement, no modern nation could resist.
President Woodrow Wilson, 1919

INTRODUCTION
International economic sanctions are not singularly modem phenomena . In
ancient Greece, Pericles of Athens enacted the Megerian Decree in 432 BC in response to
hostile acts taken against it by neighboring Megera . Later, during the American
Revolutionary War, Thomas Jefferson encouraged the use of sanctions as an effective
tool of coercive foreign policy to be used against the colonists' enemies . Since then ,
following the historical precedence of economic acts like the Megerian Decree , economic
sanctions have continued to be used as tools of coercive diplomatic policy. For example,
following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson encouraged the use of economic
sanctions as an equally strong, but less costly alternative to the use of military force .
However, even though economic sanctions have long been used in attempts to force
desired responses out of target nations (especially unilateral sanctions), they have seldom
achieved their stated foreign policy goals .
As previously mentioned, the use of economic coercion (sanctions) is not new.
Throughout history , sieges, blockades, and embargoes have often been used in
conjunction with military force . " Sanctions have regularly supplemented the use of
force in war and have also been used overtly and covertly to influence the foreign and
domestic policies of target states, " in the place of military aggression . (Doxey, 1980, pp.
3). But it is only since increased economic interdependence in the global market that
economic sanctions have become a foreign policy tool to be used alone, separated from
any link or threat of the use of military force. With this in mind, sanctions have become a

preferable foreign policy tool to the use of force since they do not involve a risk to the
lives of the citizens of the country imposing the sanctions. Therefore, economic
sanctions could be seen as being less violent and less risky, while simultaneously being
more "democratic" (based on international norms). (Wallensteen, 1983: 87).
Following the encouragement of people like President Woodrow Wilson, the use
of economic sanctions by both the League of Nations and the United Nations against
member states increased dramatically. These multinational organizations thought that,
with the imposition of sanctions, aggressive nations would be either deterred from using
or forced to stop the use of military force . Therefore, the use of economic sanctions as a
tool of those trying to secure a global collective security increased dramatically following
World War I. However, after sanctions failed to work against Italy between 1935 and
1936, faith in them as a tool of collective security began to significantly wane .
(Wallensteen , I 983: 88).
Then, following World War II, economic sanctions became known as a way of
expressing opposition to and displeasure with the domestic policies and practices of
target nations, even if the offending practices did not threaten the collective security. In
fact, since the end of the war, sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia in 1966
(Renwick, 1981: 74), Greece, Portugal and Spain because other members of the
international community did not approve of the policies and practices of their respective
regimes . In addition, sanctions have even been imposed against other target nations
because of their ideologies (e.g . sanctions imposed against Cuba for being Communist).
(Wallensteen, 1983: 89). However, then as now, the effectiveness of economic sanctions
as a coercive diplomatic tool of foreign policy has been revealed as limited.
Many contemporary experts agree that American economic sanctions do not
work. For, according to sanction scholars like James Blessing, "it can be argued that the
7

suspension of aid does not appear to have been a very effective means of inducing change
in recipient behavior. This conclusion is in general agreement with the conclusions of
numerous other studies which show that neither the granting of aid nor the use of
economic sanctions have been effective mechanisms of inducing behavior change," in
target countries . (Blessing , 1981: 533 ; Bienen and Gilpin , 1980: 89 ; and Taubenfeld ,
1964: 188).
American economic sanctions allow Fidel Castro to blame the US for his own
failures and some might suggest that the ineffective sanctions be either modified or
dropped entirely. This course of action has been suggested to American officials in order
to remove from Castro the opportunity to blame the US for his own economic and
political errors in judgement. Even Castro's own daughter , Alina Fernandez Revuelta,
recently commented along these same lines to USA Today that, "it's impossible not to lift
the embargo . He (Castro) , himself doesn't want it lifted since it is his only pretext for the
poverty and misery in Cuba. " (Deane, 1998: 17A) .
In fact, 22 US Senators sent a letter to President Clinton in November of 1998
stating that the time and place has come to look into ending the American embargo of
Cuba . "Our policy toward Cuba has not changed in nearly forty years," the letter said ,
"but the world we live in has changed a lot. It is, therefore, time for a serious , systematic
look at our policy," regarding the use of economic sanctions against Cuba. (Deane , 1998:
17A).
Economic sanctions appear to be worthy of further study mostly because of their
prevalent use within the contemporary international arena of coercive diplomacy. Other
tools of coercive diplomacy, while effective, are less frequently applied and often call for
the overt application of military force. Military force that is applied either as a show of
aggression towards the target nation's leadership or as a sign of displeasure with the
8

target nation's internal policy choices. Consequently , because of the prevalent
application of economic sanctions as a coercive tool of foreign policy , this paper will
look to explore the use of unilateral economic sanctions as they have been applied to
Fidel Castro's Cuba by the United States. For, even though Cuba had all of the
conditions and characteristics that should have made it extremely susceptible to the
influence of economic sanctions on its domestic policy choices , it has been able to
withstand the test of more that four decades of economic sanctions.
The Hypothesis

The primary problem addressed by this paper is that economic sanctions generally
fail. And one of the reasons that they fail is the central issue of this study . Consequently ,
the hypothesis of this paper is that as the period of time that unilateral economic
sanctions are imposed increases, the target nation's opportunities to overcome key
vulnerabilities increases and, as a result, the effectiveness of the unilateral economic
sanctions imposed decreases . As its main focus , this study will look at the economic

sanctions imposed by the United States against Cuba and their effectiveness at achieving
their stated American foreign policy goals . This 'effectiveness ' can be evaluated by
seeing whether or not the economic harm incurred, "has translated through the target
state's political system and into either policy or regime changes ." (Losman. 1979: 41).
International economic sanctions , have often been defined as "a ban on the
movement of goods and hard currency to and from a foreign country ." (LatinFinance).
However, for the purposes of this research project, it is necessary to narrow down the
previous , general definition to include 'unilateral economic sanctions' . Therefore, we
will define unilateral economic sanctions as economic restrictions or measures used by
one country or state against another to both uphold standards of behavior expected by that
country's customs or laws and to attain a specific foreign policy goal.
9

The purpose of this paper
Authors like Kaempfer and Lowenberg have already done extensive research
regarding the public choice theory-based justifications for the use of economic sanctions ,
and any attempt made by this study to add to their work will be feeble at best. Therefore,
the purpose of this paper is to follow more closely to the trail of case studies blazed by
sanction scholars like Margaret Doxey, Donald Losman and Donna Kaplowitz that
attempt to explain why economic sanctions are ineffective. Both Doxey and Losman
look at the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in general while Kaplowitz tries to
cover the Cuban case study in its entirety.

In addition, this paper will attempt to answer

whether or not economic sanctions become less effective as time increases . This is
important because having a generally established time period would allow policy makers
to try economic sanctions for a time and then move on to use other foreign policy tools if
the sanctions fail to attain their stated foreign policy goals.
Then, following the introduction and the statement of purpose , the author will
explore the definitions regarding the roles and functions of economic sanctions as tools of
coercive diplomacy as they have been presented by authors like Wallensteen , Doxey,
Kaplowitz and Losman . By looking at the various definitions of sanctions we will add to
our general knowledge about the effectiveness of economic sanctions as coercive foreign
policy tools. Next, we will look at a general introduction to the problems associated with
the application of economic sanctions followed by the hypothesis or major proposition of
this paper. This, in tum, will be followed by a presentation of the methodology or testing
strategy by which the author intends to test the hypothesis of this paper.
After presenting the previously described framework, upon which the rest of this
paper will be built, the author will look into the history and background of economic
sanctions. This section will provide the reader with a brief historical background of
10

sanctions, from the time of the Megarian Decree in ancient Greece to the time of the
American Sanctions imposed against Cuba.
Then, following a brief historical description of the evolution of American
economic sanctions in general, we will look into the reasons why democratic nations like
the US have been inclined to impose them against target nations, from the time of
Thomas Jefferson to the time of Bill Clinton. This general treatment of the history of
American economic sanctions will be followed by an in depth look into the evolution and
specifics of the American economic sanctions applied against Cuba. This section will
cover the history of US sanctions against Cuba from their embryonic stage of
development during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower through their
metamorphoses during the Kennedy, Carter, Reagan and Clinton regimes and up to the
present day. This is important since the American experience with economic sanctions
against Cuba will be used as the real-world test case for the hypothesis of this paper.
Following the historical background of economic sanctions in general and US
economic sanctions against Cuba in particular, this paper will next analyze how the US
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba have affected the Cuban economy. This is
relatively important to understand since authors like Losman have suggested that the
political purposes of economic sanctions (their foreign policy goals) can not be attained
without the sanctions first negatively impacting the economy of the target regime.
(Losman, 1979: 41 ). Therefore, by finding out how much the US economic sanctions
imposed against Cuba negatively affected the Cuban economy, we should be able to see
that the economic damage was insufficient to translate into the desired regime changes,
political policy alterations or an ideological reorientation. And finally, after looking at
the economic impact of the US sanctions against Cuba, we will summarize the key points
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of this paper as well as state the conclusions that the author has drawn from the evidence
presented herein.
The Problem
The main problem with economic sanctions as tools of foreign policy is that we
have had to ask ourselves repeatedly why they seldom work. In other words, economic
sanctions are often ineffective at meeting their stated foreign policy goals. Whether they
are ineffective because they have been unilaterally applied or because the target nation is
eventually able to circumvent the negative impacts caused by economic sanctions may be
part of the explanation. Still, the matter of primary importance is whether or not
economic sanctions have been able to attain their stated foreign policy objectives.
Then, the second problem that must be addressed regarding the use of economic
sanctions as tools of foreign policy is why sanctions fail to achieve their stated goals. Of
course, in a limited number of cases (between 13 and 15 percent), economic sanctions
have succeeded in attaining their foreign policy goals. However, as the length of time
that the sanctions are imposed increases , the less effective the sanctions become.
(Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 6). In other words, the longer that the imposing country waits for
sanctions to work, the less likely that they will succeed at attaining their stated foreign
policy goals at all.
Granted, in some cases like South Africa and Columbia, sanctions have been able
to achieve some of their stated foreign policy goals some of the time. However,
especially following World War II, most economic sanctions have failed. In many cases,
they have been unable to do what they were supposed to do or cause what they were
supposed to cause a majority of the time . According to Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott
and Kimberly Elliott, "extensive research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions
throughout this century suggests that," (Elliott, 1997: l) unilateral sanctions - even when
12

imposed by the largest economic power in the world - are unlikely to succeed when
applied in today's increasingly interdependent global economy. For, as Elliott continues,
"since 1970, unilateral US sanctions have achieved some of their foreign policy goals in
only 13 percent of the cases where they have been imposed." (Elliott , 1997: l) .
Thirteen percent of economic sanctions imposed during the past two decades,
then, have only partially succeeded at attaining some of their stated foreign policy goals.
An unacceptable rate of failure if it were applied to the use of military force. And yet, the
American political leadership seems perfectly satisfied with the current pace being set by
its ineffective economic sanctions .
However, it is not the passage of time alone that undermines the effectiveness of
economic sanctions. There are other factors that contribute to the failure of economic
sanctions. Episodes between close allies are generally short, to the point , and often
successful. Conversely, if the target nation shares its animosity for the imposing country
with a foreign power, the target country is more likely to overcome the negative affects of
economic sanctions by receiving economic assistance from that foreign power especially if the sanctions last for an extended period of time. And finally, the greater the
inherent likelihood of success of economic sanctions against a certain target country, the
shorter the time needed to achieve results. In other words, if the economic sanctions
applied against a target nation are going to work at all, they should be able to attain their
stated foreign policy goals within a relatively short period of time. Otherwise , if the
sanctions are allowed to drag on for an extended time period, and even if the foreign
policy goals are met , chances are that the success of the sanctions episode will be
attributable to external influences other than the economic sanctions.
In any event, the inverse relationship between the effectiveness and the duration
of the economic sanctions argues against a strategy of slowly applying more and more
13

pressure over time until the target country caves in. Time affords the target country the
opportunity to find alternative suppliers, to build new economic relationships with other
nations, and to mobilize domestic popular opinion in support of its policies. (Hufbauer, et
al, 1990: 6). Consequently, sanctions that are imposed quickly and harshly have an
increased chance of succeeding.
As previously mentioned, sanctions that are long and drawn out over an extended
period of time, allow the target country to overcome the "key vulnerabilities" that made it
an attractive target for the application of economic sanctions in the first place . "The
average cost imposed by sanctions against the target nation as a percentage of GNP in
success cases was 2.4 % and 1% in failures. Also, while successful economic sanctions
lasted an average of 2.9 years, the duration of ineffective sanctions considered to be
failures was eight years or longer." (Hufbauer, et al: 1). Therefore, based on the
preceding information, it should be easy to see that it is better to apply sanctions hard and
fast rather than let sanctions drag on for years. And yet, with the case of Cuba, the US
has decided that sanctions might work if we just give them another year to force Fidel
Castro to change his domestic politics and offending policies.

Methodology
If the hypothesis of this paper holds true in the Cuban case, one would expect to
see a negative relationship between the increase in the period of time that unilateral
economic sanctions are imposed and the ability of the target country (Cuba) to overcome
key vulnerabilities.

Additionally, one would also expect to see that the increased ability

of the target nation to overcome key vulnerabilities results in the decreased effectiveness
of the sanctions at attaining their stated goals.
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Time / Ability to overcome vulnerabilities
Hypothetical trend in decreased effectiveness of unilateral
economic sanctions when both time and ability to overcome
key vulnerabilities are simultaneously increased.
In order to find out if a negative relationship exists between the two independent
variables and the dependent variable of my hypothesis, I plan to use the non-experimental
method of a case study research design. Case study research allows students to look
closely at events and learn about the multitude of factors that may be involved in
explaining the (in)effectiveness of sanctions.
Further, after looking at alternative explanations for the ineffectiveness of
unilateral economic sanctions, the author realizes that the hypothesis of this study does
not take into account some other variables that might also influence the effectiveness of
15

the sanctions. For example, it does not account for the "cult of personality" or powerful
personal influences that some dictators, as leaders of target nations, have over their
people. Also, this study does not account for the additional variable of the predominant
religions of these countries. Some of the countries currently under unilateral economic
sanctions have general religious beliefs and/or cultural attributes that make it less likely
for the common people to put any pressure on their govemment(s) to comply with the
demands of the country imposing the sanctions against them. And yet, after considering
all of these other possible variables, the author has chosen the independent variables that
he did in order to keep the hypothesis of this paper both simple and generally applicable.
Units of Analysis

Even though unilateral economic sanctions can be and sometimes are imposed by
nations against corporations, for the purposes of this study, we will look only at unilateral
economic sanctions imposed by the United States against Cuba in order to attain
specifically stated policy goals.

Initially, Cuba was chosen as the focus of this case

study since it has had unilateral economic sanctions imposed against it by the US for
almost 40 years. After having to face nearly four decades of unilateral economic
sanctions imposed against it by the US, Cuba has had sufficient time to overcome the
key vulnerabilities. In addition, the duration of the sanctions also allows us to judge the
success of the American economic sanctions at attaining their stated goals. Therefore, by
looking at the Cuban case, we should be able to examine intensely the hypothesis of this
paper, try to define the relationship between the variables and demonstrate whether or not
the expected results prove to hold true in the real world.

16

DEFINITIONS
Sanctions/Unilateral

Sanctions

First, in the legal profession, "negative sanctions are measures of enforcement
which follow violations of law . They are penalties which indicate the limits of
permissible conducts and encourage compliance with known rules." (Doxey , 1996: 7). In
an ideal world, negative sanctions would be a sufficient deterrent to countries or regimes
that are thinking about violating international laws or norms. However, some nations
disregard the threat posed by potential negative sanctions and consequently are subjected
to the punishments that sanctions impose. And yet, even though there is no inherent
problem with the concept of economic sanctions imposed within a nation (fines ,
penalties, etc.) where legislators can pass sanctions into law , the international arena is
quite different. (Doxey , 1996: 7).
In the international aren a, the main actors are not individu al citizens or
companies . Rather , they are "sover eign states, subject to no overarching authority , and
there are few international institutions comparable to those found in states ." (Doxey,
1996: 8). Therefore , in the international arena, the definition of sanctions given above is
inapplicable. Moreover, even if a broader definition of sanctions which includes the
defense of international norms as well as international laws issued , there is still a problem
with the fact that nation-states that do not, "exhibit social cohesion to any marked
degree." (Doxey, 1996: 8). As a result , it is not surprising that international sanctions are
no longer given legal definitions or that many different definitions of sanctions are used
today.
In response to this problem, David Baldwin developed three common definitions
for the term 'economic sanctions' . First, he defined economic sanctions as, "a rather
narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law".
17

Second, "sanctions refer to the types of values ... intended to be reduced or augmented in
the target state ." Third, "the term sanctions corresponds to the concept of economic
techniques of statecraft ," (Baldwin, 1985: 35-36) upon which this paper is based.
Baldwin contrasts the definitions in terms of their scope. Economic sanctions are either
measures used to enforce international law, which he considers to be, "narrowly legalistic
and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy analysis," or they are governmental
economic tools used to gain influence over the target nation. (Baldwin, 1985: 36).
However, the third definition of sanctions offered by Baldwin is too broad since it allows
any politically motivated act of coercive economic foreign policy to be called a sanction .
Yet, it is nevertheless both possible and desirable to, "preserve the sense of
sanctions as penalties linked to real (or even alleged) misconduct." (Doxey, 1996: 9) .
From this perspective, violations of international laws (or even international norms) and
the use of internationally backed enforcement tools are possible, but not essential to the
use of economic sanctions in the international arena. (Doxey , 1996: 9). However, what is
important is to separate sanctions from violent (the use of force) or even non-violent
(diplomacy) foreign policy tools that are used , "specifically to further the interests of one
or more states at the expense of others. Therefore, international sanctions can be properly
defined as penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target
nation's failure to observe international standards of conduct or to meet international
obligations ." (Doxey, 1996: 9).
As previously mentioned, for the purposes of this paper, it has been necessary to
narrow down the previous general definition of economic sanctions to include 'unilateral
economic sanctions'. Consequently, unilateral economic sanctions will be defined in this
paper as: economic restrictions or measures imposed by one country or state against
another to both uphold standards of behavior expected by the imposing country's customs
18

or laws and/or to attain a specific foreign policy goal or set of goals. Goals such as
forcing a change in the leadership of the target nation's regime, policy reorientation, or an
ideological alteration.
These 'unilateral sanctions', "can either be acts of self help directly related to an
injury sustained by the government imposing them (reprisal sanctions), or penalties for
violations of internationally accepted rules or standards of conduct." (Doxey, 1996: 10).
In this sense, by claiming violation of internationally accepted norn1s or laws, unilateral
economic sanctions carry more credibility and encourage other nations to adopt the
sanctions on their own against the target country.
Furthermore, in addition to the issue of added international credibility,
governments try to base their unilateral economic sanctions on moral grounds or
internationally accepted norms to justify their sanctions domestically.

Imposing nations,

"will say that they are imposing sanctions to defend legitimate , worthy and general
interests rather than to advance particular interests of their own. " (Doxey, 1996: 10).
However, before believing the claims of the imposing nation, we must investigate the
circumstances associated with each and every case . For, unless rules and norms have
indeed been violated, the justification or authority claimed by the imposing nation for its
application of unilateral economic sanctions can not be validated .

Time
The period of time necessary for a target nation to get "over the hump" or initial
shock period of the most negative effects of economic sanctions varies from target to
target based upon the number and degree of vulnerabilities it has to overcome. For
example, the period of time necessary for Rhodesia to overcome its key vulnerabilities,
was five years. Meanwhile, for Cuba, the time period needed to overcome the negative
effects of the US imposed sanctions has been estimated to have been anywhere from one
19

year to almost a decade . Yet, even though Rhodesia and Cuba took different periods of
time to overcome the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed against them, it
is important that we try to set a period of time sufficient enough for a target to overcome
its key vulnerabilities. By overcoming its key vulnerabilities, the target nation is also
able to overcome the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed against it thereby rendering the sanctions ineffective.
According to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, "the most effective sanctions are
imposed quickly and decisively to maximize impact ('successful' sanctions lasted an
average of 2.9 years while failures lasted an average of 8 years)." (Hufbauer, et al, I 990:
I). Therefore, for the purposes of our study here, this paper will set the period of time at
eight years (following the time frame used by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott) so that we
will have a concrete, empirically observable time frame with which we will work. This is
important because , if we failed to establish a set period of time by which sanctions should
work (and after which they become increasingly ineffective), we could draw whatever
conclusions we wanted to from the case being studied at any given time . One paper
might wait forever until the economic sanctions imposed against a target country attained
their goal(s) and claim that they were successful, while another would wait only a brief
period of time and then claim that the sanctions were i_neffective. Thereby incorrectly
proving their hypotheses to be correct.
Following this line of thinking, if a sanction effectively attains its foreign policy
goals before a period of eight years has expired, then our hypothesis would have us
believe that the target had been unable to overcome its key vulnerabilities . However, if
after eight years passes and the sanctions still have not attained their goal(s), this study
proposes that the sanctions are unlikely to ever attain their goals without some additional
"shock" such as the use of military force to affect the desired change(s).
20

Key Vulnerabilities

The 'key vulnerabilities looked at in this paper include: first and foremost a lack
of diversity in trading partners; second, little diversification in domestic production; and
third , a weak or poorly developed economy. First, a lack of diversity in trading partners
will be defined by identifying the number and variety of trading partners that both supply
a majority of the goods imported into the country and buy a majority of the target's
exported goods. Second, the diversification of domestic production will be defined by
the level of domestic agricultural and industrial output as well as by evaluating whether
or not domestic production levels dropped or increased following the application of
economic sanctions. And finally, the level of economic performance of the target
nation's economy will be defined and evaluated by looking at the annual growth rate of
the GMP (similar to the GNP and used by socialist economist in the 1960s to measure
economic growth rates - excludes certain transportation sectors from the calculation of
economic progression) as well as the GNP . For , according to sanction scholars like
Perez-Lopez and Zimbalist, both the GMP and the GNP can be used to effectively
measure the health of a target nation's economy.
Ability to overcome

By looking at the level of economic development, diversification of both domestic
production and number of trading partners of the target nation (Cuba) of this case study,
we should be able to determine to what extent Cuba has been able to overcome the
negative repercussions of the American economic sanctions imposed against it.
Therefore, this paper will look at Cuba, both before the unilateral economic sanctions
were imposed, and after the predetermined eight-year period has ended, to see how well
Cuba has been able to raise its level of economic development (as indicated by the annual
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rate of growth of its GNP), diversify its domestic production and increase the number of
its trading partners.
Then, if we find that Cuba has been able to overcome the previously listed key
vulnerabilities, we must subsequently accept that the unilateral economic sanctions failed
to prevent the Cuban economy from growing. And if the sanctions failed to prevent the
economy from growing, we should be able to see that they also failed to impose sufficient
economic harm to force Cuba into acquiescing to America's demands. In other words, if
Cuba has been able to overcome its key vulnerabilities after eight years of sanctions, and
the economic harm imposed by the sanctions is insufficient to force Cuba to change its
policies, then the US sanctions have not been able to attain their stated foreign policy
goals and must be categorized as failures.
Negative impact
Next, the 'negative impact' of economic sanctions means in this case that the
sanctions have damaged the target's economy so much that - for one reason or another the target nation is forced to act. Whether it acts by changing its policies in accordance
with the sanctions' goals or by diversifying its domestic production - and its trading
partners - such forced changes in behavior amount to both unwanted and increased
(negative) costs.
Ineffectiveness
Following the application of economic sanctions against a target nation, the target
nation is subjected to the sanction's negative effects. And, if the sanctions are effective,
they will force the target nation to modify its political behavior in response to the
negative effects of the sanctions. However, economic sanctions still can not be seen as
effective unless the target nation's political response to the negative effects of the
economic sanctions is the response sought after by the nation applying the sanctions.
22

Therefore, a sanction can be seen as effective only of it achieves its stated political or
foreign policy goals. And yet, if the country imposing the sanctions continues to apply
them against the target nation over an extended period of time, it is essentially stating by
its actions that it does not believe that the sanctions have achieved their stated foreign
policy goals. Otherwise, if the sanctions had successfully attained their stated foreign
policy goals, there would be no reason to maintain the sanctions for even one additional
day.
Examples given in the paper earlier included the use of unilateral economic
sanctions to stop human rights violations, antiterrorism , nuclear non-proliferation, antinarcotics, to induce political instability, and workers rights. But, without being quite so
specific, I will state here that economic sanctions are effective only if they attain their
stated foreign policy goals of forcing a change in the target nation's domestic policies,
regime , or leadership, or ideology.
Therefore, given the definition of a successful sanction. I will posit here that an
ineffective episode of economic sanctions will be defined as any sanction that does not
meet the requirements to be an effective sanction.

In other words, if the economic

sanctions imposed against a target nation fail to achieve their stated objectives, and the
imposing nation continues to apply the sanctions, the sanctions must be recognized as
being ineffective - a failure. Moreover, as the dependent variable of my hypothesis, it is
essential to the success of this paper that I am able to illustrate the negative or positive
effects that the two independent variables (time and the ability to overcome the 'key
vulnerabilities) have on the level of effectiveness of the US economic sanctions imposed
against Cuba.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF SANCTIONS

History tells us that economic sanctions are not singularly modem phenomena .
Throughout history, from the ancient Greeks to the present time, economic sanctions
have been used by some of the most powerful nations, as coercive foreign policy tools in
both their economic relations and their political conduct with other nations . In ancient
Greece, for example, the domineering Pericles of Athens enacted the Megerian Decree of
432 BC in response to hostile acts taken against Athens by Megera, a neighboring citystate . The trade boycott prevented Megerian ships from accessing Athenian ports and
excluded Megerian merchants from the markets of Athens. "The subsequent refusal of
Athens to lift the boycott of Megera (a Spartan ally), in response to pressure from Sparta ,
was popularly believed to have caused the Peloponnesian War." (Baldwin, 1985: 150).
Thus , the Megerian Decree became one of the first historically documented cases
of the use of economic sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool. As such , it is
important to note for a couple of reasons . "First , it is a valuable reminder that economic
sanctions are not a twentieth-century phenomenon .... And second, the case is sometimes
used to buttress the contention that economic sanctions are costly and ineffective
techniques of statecraft." (Baldwin, 1985: 150).
Since that time , following the historical precedence of economic sanctions like the
Megarian Decree, economic sanctions have continued to be used as tools of coercive
diplomacy. First, they have been used to protect economic and commercial interests
when faced with international competitors. And, second, they have been used in attempts
to put pressure on target nations . Pressure used either to influence the domestic political
policy choices of the target nations or to destabilize dictators or regimes that are believed
to be 'hostile' or 'unfriendly' (Alerassool, 1993: 1).
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The historical record further demonstrates that, by themselves , economic
sanctions have seldom been able to, "roll back military aggression, have had a limited
capacity to impair their targeted regime's daily operations, or force that regime into
changing its domestic policies, and have never toppled a dictator." (Lopez, 1997: 70).
Moreover, since the effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions depends on many
variables over which the sanctioning country has little control (like religion, external
financial support by some foreign power, and the 'cu lt of personality' of the dictator in
power), it is not surprising that these sanctions often inflict only minor and/or temporary
damage on the target nation.
Next, being unable to either inflict sufficient damage on the target's economy, or
to obtain sufficient control over the target's policy making process, the foreign policy
goals of the country imposing the economic sanctions can not be achieved - and the
sanctions fail. Thus, as Kaempfer comments, "it wou ld be nothing short of an amazing
coincidence if the effects of unilateral economic sanctions also happened to be damaging
to the target nation." (Kaempfer, 1992: 163).
Then, with the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in mind, this paper not only
agrees with Kaempfer, but also proposes further that the desired outcomes of economic
sanctions - their foreign policy goals - are rarely attained. For, according to Losman,
"economic harm must be translated through the target state's political system into policy
or regime changes. But, to the degree that dictators like Castro prevail, or charismatic
leaders engender popular support in spite of (or often with the aid of sanctions), the
desired political changes rarely if ever occur." (Losman, 1979 : 41 ).
In sum, research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions since the time of the
Megerian Decree suggests that economic sanctions are unlikely to successfully attain
their stated foreign policy goals. In addition, a review of (unilateral) economic sanctions
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since the 1900' s suggests that unilateral sanctions - even when imposed by one of the
most dominant economic powers in the world - face difficult challenges, especially in an
increasingly integrated international economy. Even against such small and vulnerable
targets as Panama, Haiti, and Cuba, military force was eventually used (unsuccessfully in
the case of Cuba) in an attempt to achieve American foreign policy goals - goals that
seemed so unattainable to American policy makers when sanctions were used alone
against the targeted regimes.
American economic sanctions

Since 1960, US sanctions have achieved foreign policy goals in only 13% of the
cases where they have been imposed. (Elliott, 1997: 2). And yet, this cycle of failure
remains incapable of deterring American policy makers from their continued reliance on
economic sanctions as their main coercive foreign policy tool. In addition to whatever
effect repeated failure may have on the credibility of the American leadership, other
recent research suggests that economic sanctions are costing the US between $15 and $19
billion dollars in potential exports lost. This, in tum, translates into 200,000 or more jobs
lost in the relatively highly paid sector of employees working in export related jobs.
(Hufbauer, et al, 1997: 2). As such, this persistent reliance on economic sanctions, in
spite of available evidence indicating their ineffectiveness, can only have a negative
effect on the credibility of the American political leadership.
One example of sanctions research, by the Institute for International Economics
regarding the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, was recently presented
by research fellow Kimberly Ann Elliott before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Committee on Ways and Means. In her statement, Ms Elliott empirically addresses the
'conventional wisdom' of economic sanctions. Such 'conventional wisdom', as
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explained by Ms. Elliott, suggests, "that sanctions never work, that they are costly
politically and economically, and that their use should be constrained". (Elliott, 1997: 2).
With the goal of constraining the use of economic sanctions in mind, the
Institute's study empirically assessed the outcomes of 115 cases of economic sanctions,
beginning during World War I and ending in the 1990s. Of the 115 cases studied, the
US was a participant (either as part of a group or independently) in 78 of the cases.
Consequently, since America was involved in such a large portion of the cases, the results
of the study as a whole can be broadly applied to the US. For example, the results of
Elliott's study, indicate that the 69% failure rate of US economic sanctions was
comparatively close to the 65% failure rate of the group studied as a whole. (Elliott,
1997: 2). Consequently, with the results of the study showing that sanctions fail more
than two-thirds of the time, American policy makers should be willing to try out other
foreign policy tools besides sanctions.
Yet, even after noting the 69% failure rate, the most important result of the
Institute 's study is the fact that the effectiveness of American backed sanctions declines
drastically when they are unilaterally imposed by the US alone. "Prior to the 1970s," for
example, "sanctions in which the US was involved alone ...succeeded at least partially just
over 50% of the time."(Elliott, 1997: 2). Then, between 1970 and 1990, the effectiveness
of US sanctions fell to nearly 21 %. This shows a post-1970 increase in the rate of failure
for American backed sanctions to almost 79%. A 'batting average' that is entirely too
poor for any corporate executive, but apparently still perfectly suitable for the US
political leadership.

The US seems to use sanctions whenever it is faced with a foreign policy problem.
A little more than two years ago, President Bill Clinton lamented the fact that
America had become, "sanctions happy." And yet, Clinton is the president who has
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signed laws for new economic sanctions against the target nations of India, Pakistan,
Cuba, Iran and Libya and has used his executive powers to add to the rich legacy of
sanctions inherited from past occupants of the White House. A pattern of behavior far
different from what we would expect from someone "lamenting" America's over-reliance
on economic sanctions.
Maintaining its "sanctions happy" posture, the US has employed economic
sanctions more often than any other country in the world. Early after World War I, the
American infatuation with economic sanctions began when President Woodrow Wilson
tried to sell the idea of the League of Nations to his countrymen, together with its newly
crafted foreign policy tool of economic sanctions. Wilson famously declared in 1919
that, "a nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic,
peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible
remedy," for terrible problems. (Padover, 1942: I 08). Still, Americans did not buy into
the concept of the League of Nations (the Senate refused to ratify US membership in that
precursor to the United Nations). But, as time passed, American policy makers adopted
Wilson's idea of sanctions as their top choice for a foreign policy tool.
For example, since the end of World War I, the United States imposed economic
sanctions more than 110 times (32 cases more than were covered in the Institute for
International Economics' study). Such sanctions, as an often-used tool of American
coercive diplomacy, as well as the denial of a target nation of customary export items,
have included the severance of import or other financial relations with a target country.
Both are examples of severe courses of action, taken in an effort to force the target nation
to change its social, political or economic policies.
In one instance, the US voted to block World Bank or International Monetary
Fund loans in an effort to stop the spread of nuclear proliferation around the globe (e.g.
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India and Pakistan) .

In other instances, the US restricted trade with a country to try and

force it to change its human rights or political policies (i.e. Argentina, Chile , China and
Cuba) . And occasionally, in the most severe cases of disobedience to the desires of the
American political leadership, the US has been known to impose sanctions in an attempt
to force the ouster of a foreign dictator or regime (Iraq and Serbia).
Whatever the motivating factor, the current list of US sanctions covers 26 target
countries, accounting for more than half of the world's population. And recently, since
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the American Congress has felt freer
to interfere in US foreign policy issues by instructing the president on the smallest details
regarding both the imposition and waiving of sanctions . In short, whenever tensions rise,
and the US becomes dissatisfied with the social , political or economic policies of another
country, sanctions are often used as America ' s 'first strike' weapon of choice . (Hufbauer,
1998: C0l).

TABLES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES
Countries in Which
US Economic
Sanctions are in full
force - total embargo
(1)

Countries on StateSponsored Terrorism
List - US Restriction
on Financial
Transactions

Countries on Drug
De-Certification List
(2)

Cuba
Iran
Iraq
Libya
North Korea

Cuba
Iran
Iraq
Libya
North Korea
Syria
Sudan

Afghanistan
Burma (Myanmar)
Columbia
Iran
Nigeria
Syria

Likely Targets of
Future Sanctions(3)

China (4)
Burma (5)
(Myanmar)
Nigeria
Indonesia
Mexico
Pakistan
Angola
Algeria
Turkey
Liberia
Burundi
Serbia
Source: Personal communications with personnel at the US State Department (Non-attributable)
- Legislation passed by Congress in 1996 places additional restrictions on foreign companies
that invest in the energy sector in Iran and Libya (oil) or the use of appropriated property in Cuba
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confiscated from American corporations and citizens.
- Countries that are decertified because of poor counter-narcotics enforcement lose eligibility
for US foreign aid. The US government is obliged to vote "no" on loan applications from these
countries that are filed with multilateral development banks (The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund). National interest waivers have been granted however, to
Lebanon, Pakistan, and Paraguay.
- These countries have been targeted for sanctions by American legislators in recent bills or
by the media and a list of these countries is constantly updated by the US Department of State .
- As an result of the massacre of student-protestors in Tiananmen Square, the US
government restricts Chinese purchases of US made military equipment, law enforcement
materials and modem computer technology .
- Sanctions are in place today that deny US visas to certain Burmese political leaders and
that direct American votes against Burma in multilateral lending institutions; The president of
the US has the option to decide on other additional measures.

'A Terrible Remedy'
Ongoing foreign policy sanctions, defined as the "deliberate, government-inspired
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations," have been
imposed either multilaterally by the UN or unilaterally by the United States on the
following nations:
Target
Country
Angola

Initial
Year
1993

Type of Sanctions

Precipitating Event

Limited trade restrictions
(anns and oil embargo);
Air and travel sanctions

Failure to implement
peace agreement

Azerbaijan

1992

Embargo of Annenia over
Nagomo-Karabakh

Burma
(Myanmar)

1988

Cambodia

1992

Restriction on financial
assistance (including
Overseas Private
Investment Corp.)
Restrictions on aid
(including US ExportImport Bank , OPIC),
travel restrictions, Ban on
trade preferences,
Investment ban
Limited trade restrictions
(log boycott; oil
embargo)

Cameroon

1992

Restrictions on aid

China

1989

Restrictions on financial
assistance, Exim, OPIC;
Limited export restriction
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Key Changes to
Sanctions
Air and travel ban
( 1997): Ban on
UNIT A diamond
exports ( 1998)

Repression of political
opposition

Massachusetts state
sanctions ( 1996), Ban
on new U.S.
investments ( 1997)

Failure to implement
peace agreement;
repression of opposition
parties
Repression of opposition
parties
Tiananmen Square
massacre

Aid reductions ( 1997)

Limited export
restriction ( l 991) .

Cuba

1960

Comprehensive trade and
financial sanctions:
Secondary sanctions to
inhibit foreign
investment

Castro-led takeover:
military interventions in
Africa (Angola in the
l 980s):Repression of
opposition

Gambia
Haiti

1994
1997

Restrictions on aid
Restrictions on aid

Militar cou
Political instability

India

1998

Nuclear weapons tests

Indonesia

1991

Ban on financial
assistance, including
Exim, OPIC; Limited
trade restriction ; Ban on
bank loans to
government;
Postponement of nonhumanitarian official
multilateral lendin
Military aid restrictions:
Ban on arms sales

Political repression,
especially in East Timor

Iran

1984

Comprehensive trade and
financial sanctions;
Secondary sanctions to
inhibit foreign
investment

Support for terrorism ,
opposition to peace
process in Middle East;
efforts to acquire weapons
of mass destruction
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Cuban Democracy
Act restricts trade of
US subsidiaries
abroad ( 1992) .
Helms-Burton bill
codifies embargo;
adds secondary
sanctions against
third-country
investors in Cuba
( 1996)

Limited export
restrictions ( 1984)
Import boycott added
(1987)
Total export embargo
( 1995)
Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act adds secondary
sanctions against
foreign firms
investing in oil sector
(1996)
Cultural and athletic
exchange agreement
signed with the
US(l998)
Ban on the
importation of Iranian
rugs and pistachios
lifted (1999)

Iraq

1990

Liberia

1992

Libya

Comp rehen sive trade and
financial sanctions,
except limited oil sales
und er UN oil-for-food
program
Amis embargo

Invasion of Kuwait ; postwar discovery of
extensive progr am to
acquire weapons of ma ss
destruction
Civil War

1978

Comprehensive trade and
financial sanctions; Air
travel ban

Gadhafi regime support
for terrorism; bombing of
Pan Am Flight # I 03 over
Lockerby, Scotland

Niger

1996

Restrictions on aid

Military coup

Nigeria

1993

Abrogation of election
results; execution of Ken
Saro-Wiwa , other
dissidents

North Korea

1950

Restrictions on aid; US
bans all financial
assistance, Exim, OPIC;
Restrictions on arms
sales; Travel restrictions
Comprehensive trade and
financial sanctions

Pakistan

1979

'

Ban on financial
assistance, OPIC, Exim,
export credit guarantees;
Ban on bank loans to
Pakistani government;

Korean War; possible
acquisition of nuclear
weapons

Nuclear weapons
program; nuclear weapons
tests

Limited US export
restrictions ( 1978)
US boycotts Libyan
oil (1982)
US imposes
comprehensive
sanctions ( 1986)
UN impose s limited
trade sanctions; airtravel ban ( 19921993)
Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act adds secondary
sanctions against
foreign finns
investing in oil sector
(1996)

UN threatens trade
and financial
sanctions to forestall
nuclear weapons
acquisition (1993-94)
US imposes limited
sanctions ( 1979)
US waives sanctions
during Soviet
intervention in

Afghanistan ( 1980s)
US expands
sanctions; g-8
imposes limited
sanctions ( 1998)

Postponement of nonhumanitarian loans

Somalia
Sudan

1992
1988

Arms embargo
Comprehensive trade and
financial sanctions

Civil war
Civil war and human
rights abuses; support for
terrorism

Syria

1986

Support for terrorism

Vietnam

1954

Ban on US assistance,
including Exim, OPIC;
Limited trade restrictions
Denied most-favorednation status

Yugoslavia

1991

Comprehensive trade and
financial assistance
sanctions

Vietnam War and
aftermath; American
personnel missing in
action

Civil war in Bosnia;
implementation of Dayton
agreement ending Bosnian
war; intervention of
Serbian troops in Kosovo

Mobutu corruption and
suppression of opposition;
continued repression
under Kabila re ime
Repression of opposition,
aid
on
Restrictions
1996
Zambia
human rights violations
1998: C04-C07).
(Hufbauer,
Economics.
International
Source: Institute for
Zaire

1990

Restrictions on aid

Aid sanctions ( 198889)

Total trade embargo
lifted; other
restrictions remained
(1994)
Most-favored-nation
status reinstated
(2000)
UN trade sanctions
lifted, restrictions on
multilateral lending,
other limited
sanctions remain
(1995)
Additional sanctions
imposed against
Serbia over Kosovo
(1998)
Sanctions continued
after Kabila takeover
( 1998)

Why America is so eager to use sanctions.
Since sanctions have become so prevalent as an American foreign policy tool, we
must ask ourselves first of all why American officials are so eager to use economic
sanctions as their main foreign policy tool. And secondly, we must also ask ourselves
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what we have learned from the American reliance on sanctions as a coercive diplomatic
tool. Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are neither simple nor brief.
First , as a substitute for the use of military force, sanctions have become the
bloodless choice of American politicians wishing to demonstrate their resolve against
dictators and tyrannical governments throughout the 20 th century. For, according to
Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann, "the attribution 'democracy' carries with
it the expectation that such a government will.favor bargaining, mediation, compromise,

and other nonviolent methods of conflict resolution over .forceful coercion.for resolving
conflicts. "(Kegley, 1996: 3). In addition, Kegley and Hermann propose that the more
firmly established a democracy is (like America), the more likely it is to choose a
nonviolent method of dispute resolution along the lines of economic sanctions. (Kegley,
1996: 3).
International 'norms' influence democracies:

[n most cases, Americans are more likely to approve the use of sanctions over the
use of military force since international democratic norms promote the use of nonviolent
means of conflict resolution prior to the use of military force.

As a result of these

'norms', democracies are expected to value, "negotiation, mediation, compromise,
consensus and other nonviolent methods (like sanctions) over the use of force," by their
fellow actors on the world stage . (Kegley, 1996: 24).
In other words, the other members of the international community expect a

mature democracy like America to choose a nonviolent method of conflict resolution like
the imposition of economic sanctions over the use of overt military aggression . And with
this expectation, comes a sense of responsibility that democracies feel - a set of
reinforcing democratic norms - to use nonviolent diplomatic options to resolve a dispute.
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This sense of responsibility was in evidence as early as 1769 when American
leaders felt pressured to promote the use of economic sanctions as a substitute for the use
of military force. At that time, Thomas Jefferson encouraged applying the "peaceful
coercion" of economic sanctions to achieve a foreign policy goal. This act by Jefferson,
perhaps, came close to anticipating Woodrow Wilson's subsequent doctrine of
encouraging the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Jefferson though,
unlike Wilson, seemed to anticipate many of the difficulties to be encountered by the
countries imposing the sanctions when he stated that; "war injures the punisher as much
as the punished." In this case, the war is an economic war waged through the application
of economic sanctions, and the injuries involve dollar amounts rather than the body
counts that result from the use of military force. (Renwick, 1981: 5).
However, it is not purely out of a sense of responsibility or feelings of obligation
to the international community that American politicians prefer to apply economic
sanctions prior to resorting to the use of military force to resolve foreign policy conflicts
with target nations . The perception of the general population of a democracy is also
important. In fact, as we often take for granted, the opinion of the general public plays a
far more important role in the decision making process of a democracy than it does in the
decision making process of a non-democratic regime. The political leadership of a
democratic nation like America realizes this fact, and knows further that, without the
support of the general public, they can not remain in power (failing to win the next
election).
Politicians also realize that the American population , for example, "assumes that
diplomatic channels (or other nonviolent means) will be exhausted entirely before
military force is applied against the target nation. When responding to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, American politicians were quick to adhere to the public opinion of the American
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people and chose to impose sanctions against Iraq for close to a year before finally
approving the use of military force. Such is often the case in the US where the
application of military power is usually seen as the instrument of last resort unless the
American people, territories, or interests are directly threatened. (Kegley, 1996: 27). This
is evidenced by the American trend of applying American military force in response to
"major" attacks on the 'Maine', Pearl Harbor, and recently , in response to Osama bin
Ladin's attacks on American embassies in Africa.

And yet, when the economic

sanctions failed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait after almost a year, the American
president still decided to wait for the support of the American people before finally
approving the use of military force.
In many instances, the American political leadership has learned to respect the
opinion of the American people, and seek their support. This is especially evident
following the negative reactions of the American people to the use of military force in
Vietnam. For example, following the constant stream of body bags containing the
remain s of fallen American servicemen killed in Vietnam, the average American citizen
placed a high value on diplomatic efforts, bargaining, mediation and the use of sanctions
prior to the initiation of military strikes.
Consequently, as witnessed in the case of Iraq, President George Bush learned
from the experiences of the Vietnam era and attempted to force Saddam Hussein's troops
out of Kuwait through the imposition of economic sanctions. Later, he followed the
economic sanctions with an embargo on military shipments before finally approving the
use of military force (Operation Desert Storm) . Moreover, the economic sanctions that
were imposed against Iraq were given close to a year to achieve their stated foreign
policy objectives. And yet, even after a year, Iraq was finally forced to leave Kuwait only
after facing the allied forces led by the American military.
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However , even after looking at the Iraqi case, by keeping the casualties of the
Vietnam case in mind , it is easier to understand why Americans are so eager to approve
the use of sanctions over the use of force . This pattern of behavior is important to note
since, if the other members of the international community lose faith in the predisposition
of democratic nations to use nonviolent methods of conflict resolution , democracies will
lose the natural protection afforded them by the international expectation that
democracies are more likely to negotiate than they are to fight. (Kegley, 1996: 4).
Other reasons why American politicians are more likely to select economic
sanctions as their chosen foreign policy tool include the lingering effects of the Vietnam
and Korean War nightmares that still hang over the US. The general public opinion
regarding the use of military force as a foreign policy tool declined dramatically
following the constant stream of casualties and sound defeat of American troops fighting
in Vietnam. Those events, combined with the disappointing results of the Korean War
have left a bitter taste in the mouths of most Americans regarding the use of milit ary
force to solve international disputes . Consequently, with all of the lessons learned from
the Korean War as well as the American loss to Vietnam, American politicians
themselves encourage the use of nonviolent economic sanctions before ever considering
the approval of the use of military force .
Fourth, American politicians have also chosen economic sanctions over the use of
military force since they have known that they must take some action when faced with
political, social or economic violations of' American' standards of conduct by foreign
powers. Initially, for example , the American leadership imposed economic sanctions
against Cuba in order to force Castro out of power, the Cuban government into
democratization and the Cuban people into a state of social freedom. However , after
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maintaining the sanctions against Cuba for nearly forty years without achieving their
stated foreign policy goals, the justification for the sanctions has changed .
Today the American leadership claims that the US must maintain its economic
sanctions against Cuba, although they remain ineffective, to symbolize America's
opposition to Fidel Castro and his policies to the rest of the world. And thus, the fourth
reason why America chooses to impose economic sanctions over the use of military force
is that sanctions are now considered by the American politicians to be a symbolic gesture
of opposition to the policies of the target nation rather than a legitimate foreign policy
tool. And yet, when we consider the overwhelming international opposition to America's
use of economic sanctions (as demonstrated by recent UN votes to condemn the US
embargo against Cuba) , it should be easy to see that the use of sanctions has failed - even
as a symboli c foreign policy tool." (Hufbauer, 1998: COl ).
General lessons we have learned from the American use of sanctions

We have learned many valuable lessons from the past eighty years of America's overreliance on economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. First, as a substitute for the use
of military force (like was witnessed with Iraq) , we now know that sanctions are often
unable to force target nations into making the desired policy changes. To speak bluntly,
President Wilson was dead wrong when he stated that a, "boycotted nation ...is in sight of
surrender.. .. That if sanctions are applied, there will be no need for the use of military
force ."(Padover, 1942: l 08). In fact, maybe only one case of sanctions in five results in
policy changes that can be directly traced back to sanctions. (Hufbauer, 1998: CO2).
Democracies vs. dictatorships

Next, authoritarian dictators like Saddam Hussein have been ready, willing and
able to wait out economic sanctions imposed by America since they have nothing to fear
from the people of their own countries. A dominant political dictator, unlike American
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politicians, cares little about public opinion or gathering consensus. Initially they might
attempt to rally public support against the "A merican oppressors" as a way to divert
general sentiments of displeasure away from themselves and towards an overbearing
foreign power. Then, if they are unable to rally public support against the country
imposing the sanctions, authoritarian dictators have generally been comfortable using
military power to subdue domestic uprisings and general public discontent resulting from
the imposition of economic sanctions.
Juan J. Lopez categorizes Fidel Castro's regime as a 'sultanistic'/post-totalitarian
regime. A fundamental reason for this categorization is that, under these types of
dictatorships, there are no regime softliners (moderates) with enough power and freedom
to either contain or oppose the dictator. (Lopez, 1997: 240). In a post-totalitarian regime ,
there is a tolerance of some criticism, but "almost all control mechanisms of the party state endure and do not evolve." (Lopez, 1997: 240). In Cuba, as in Iraq, political power
is directly related to the 'sultanistic' leadership (e.g. Saddam and Castro), "and all
individuals, groups, and institutions are permanently subject to the unpredictable despotic
intervention, of the dictator. (Lopez, 1997: 240).
Additionally, in both Cuba and Iraq, the important political figures derive their
importance from their connection to their dictators. There is no room for objection, and
even moderate opposition must be crushed for the dictator to survive. Therefore,
according to Lopez, the most likely causes for the ouster of dictators like Saddam and
Fidel are mass uprisings, assassinations, military coups, or the invasion of foreign
military forces seeking to take over the dictator's country . (Lopez, 1997: 240) .
In other words, economic sanctions are not likely at all to force such regimes out
of power without being backed up with the use of military force. In fact, it is one of the
ironies of economic sanctions that authoritarian dictators - isolated from the media-based
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eye of world opinion - are less susceptible to the effects of the sanctions than their
democratic counterparts. As a result, the contrast between Sudan and South Africa or
between Cuba and Columbia could not be sharper.
For example, in the Colombian presidential elections of 1998, Andres Pastrana
was elected to replace Ernesto Sam per following several years of sanctions directed
personally against Samper by the US. Charging that Samper had accepted $6 million
dollars (US) from the Cali drug Cartel for his 1994 presidential campaign, the United
States disqualified Columbia as a recipient of US aid and revoked Samper's entry visa to
the US (in effect declaring him persona non grata). (Hufbauer, 1998: CO2). The
American actions were probably not the sole reason for Samper's loss to Pastrana, but
they most likely contributed to other domestic factors to ensure his defeat.
Another lesson learned from the use of economic sanctions is that it is naive to
think of sanctions as an effective alternative to the use of military force when dealing
with dictators and tyrants. Sanctions had little or no effect on the policies of the saberrattling Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989, Saddam Hussein in Iraq since 1990 and
Fidel Castro in Cuba since the early 1960s. Only the application of military force ended
with changes to the policies of Panama and Iraq (not mentioning the Bay of Pigs blunder
in Cuba). For example, it was only after the United States threatened further air strikes
against Iraq that Saddam allowed UN arms inspectors into his country. And, only after
the American invasion of Panama, was Noriega removed from power.
Unfortunately, when American presidents approve the use of economic sanctions,
they see them far more often as isolated measures, not as part of an escalating "use of
force" learning curve. The "use of force" learning curve follows a steady progression
from diplomatic protests and appeals, to negotiations, followed by economic sanctions,
and finally to military force. At each step, if the target nation refuses to make the policy
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changes sought by the sender , it must know that more severe actions are still to come. In
this scenario, the more belligerent the reaction of the political leadership of the target
nation, the sharper the learning curve, and the more rapid the imposing country's
transition from peaceful diplomatic protests to overt military aggression .
Yet , American politicians seem to refuse to use sanctions as one step along a
"learning curve" path of coercive foreign policy tools. The unfortunate repercussion of
this refusal is that the United States has earned a well-deserved reputation for being a soft
enforcer of its international objections to the policies and practices of target nations.
And, as a result of this "soft" reputation, target nations know that if they can survive the
negative effects of economic sanctions , they have no need to fear an escalation to the next
step of the "use of force" learning curve - overt military aggression. (Hufbauer, 1998:

CO2).
The third lesson that we have learned from the American use of economic
sanctions , is the fact that sanctions negatively impact the lives of the general populace of
the target nation while simultaneously increasing the grip of the authoritarian dictators
that the nations imposing the sanctions are trying to oust. When sanctions are imposed
against a target nation without any plans to escalate to overt military aggression, the
people of the target nation are hurt the worst. For example, as has been witnessed in
Cuba and Iraq, the hardest hit are the poor Kurds of northern Iraq, the Shiites in southern
Iraq and the poor, old and sick Cubans that are unable to get jobs earning American
dollars in Cuban tourist resorts. Consequently, while the general public suffers, intended
targets like the political leadership, the military and the economic elite are left unscathed
by the effects of the economic sanctions imposed against their country. (Hufbauer, 1998:

CO2).
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Fourth, is the lesson that sanctions applied hard and fast are more likely to
succeed (all other circumstances being equal) than sanctions that are less vigorously
applied over a long period of time . Recently, well-known economic scholars Gary
Hufbauer, Jeff Schott and Kim Elliott advocated that, "if it were done, when 'tis done,
then 'twere well it were done quickly." (Elliott, 1997: 6). With this statement, the
scholars suggest that sanctions are more effective if they are carried out quickly since a
heavy, slow hand invites both evasion by the target nation and the mobilization of
domestic opinion in the target country against the sender of the sanctions.
Sanctions imposed slowly or incrementally and without vigor may simply
strengthen the target government or dictator at home as he uses his 'power of personality'
to rally the general populace under the flag of nationalism. Moreover, such measures are
likely to be undercut over time either by corporations based within the sender's own
borders or by foreign competitors. Therefore, in support of the need for hard and fast
economic sanctions, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott reported that the average successful
cases of sanctions lasted less than three years, while sanctions deemed ineffective lasted
for more than eight years. (Elliott, 1997: 6).
However, it is not the passage of time alone that undermines economic sanctions.
Other factors are directly related to the length of economic sanctions imposed against a
target nation. Episodes between allies are generally short, to the point, and often
successful (as with the American boycott of Japanese automobiles made from less than
35% American parts). Furthermore, the target country is more likely to receive
assistance from another major power if the episode continues for a number of years (e.g.
Russian economic support for Cuba in light of American economic sanctions . And
finally, the greater the likelihood that sanctions will succeed from the beginning (all other
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circumstances being equal), the shorter the inherent period of time necessary for
sanctions to achieve their stated foreign policy objectives. (Elliott, 1997: 6).
In any event, the inverse relationship that exists between the likelihood of success
of economic sanctions and the duration of the sanctions illustrates well the argument
against gradually increasing sanctions - or "turning the screws" - against the target
nation. The longer the period that sanctions are in force, the greater the chances that the
target nation will be able to economically adjust, find alternate trading partners and
suppliers, build new alliances against the imposing country (Cuba & Russia v. America),
and mobilize domestic opinion in support of its policies. (Elliott, 1997: 6). But the lesson
that sanctions applied hard and fast are more likely to succeed poses a dilemma .
Hard core sanctions, that are intended to severely impact the economic well being
of the target nation , usually require multilateral cooperation (Iraq), if not UN or 07
support. While the US may be the sole military superpower on the world stage today, it
is but part of a cast of co-stars when the global economic players take the stage .
Therefore , without the cooperation of either the UN or 07 nations, America alone cannot
deny a target country key imports , critical markets or vital financing . These are some of
the "key vulnerabilities' that must be effectively targeted if economic sanctions are to
stand a chance of successfully attaining their foreign policy goals. As a result, the
justifications for hard or multilateral sanctions also constitute a warning to nations that
seek to impose sanctions unilaterally. (Hufbauer, 1998: C03) . The justifications also
constitute a warning because, without multilateral support, unilateral sanctions do not
stand a chance of succeeding .
Still, with the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in mind, the US continues to
adhere to its current sanctions policy and impose sanctions unilaterally against targeted
countries around the world. This adherence continues since, in the view of politicians
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like Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton , the US has a special
responsibility to deal with the misdeeds of misbehaving political leader s. And yet, since
the cost of using military force against a target nation is too high , and diplomacy is often
ineffective, politicians like Helms and Burton cave in to both international norms and
public opinion and call for the application of economic sanctions.
Then , when politicians like Helms and Burton cave into international pressure and
public opinion polls , they try to avoid the nightmares remembered from Vietnam and use
economic sanctions as the global cure-all for both problems abroad and consciences at
home. And the reason that they choose sanctions, to quote President Wilson out of
context, is that sanctions are "a terrible remedy ." (Padover, 1942: 108). In other words,
they are highly ineffective when applied unilaterally and almost never successfully
achieve their stated foreign policy goals.
The lack of benefits for using economic sanctions as an American foreign policy tool

Economic sanctions are an important tool of US foreign policy and have been
since Woodrow Wilson reintroduced them to the American public shortly after World
War I. Sanctions, as a foreign policy tool , are often used as one part of an overall
American response to the actions of foreign leaders, and the policies of target countries ,
to achieve US foreign policy goals. Such goals include: stopping military aggression ,
nuclear proliferation , state-sponsored terrorism , drug trafficking , human rights abuses and
encouraging democratization, as well as increased social, political and economic
freedoms. (Schott, 1998: 2).
Therefore, when used together with diplomatic protests , negotiations and other
measures like threatening military aggression, sanctions are used to symbolically
demonstrate the determination of the US to see the target nation alter its objectionable
course. In addition, the use of economic sanctions also expresses American outrage, calls
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on the target nation to bend to America's will , and attempts to deter other countries from
repeating the same mistakes in the future. Consequently, to effectively follow this
pattern, sanctions should not be used separately from other diplomatic or military courses
of action. Rather, to be effective, economic sanctions should be "consistent with and
well-integrated into an overall US policy response ," (Schott, 1998: 2) that allows for the
use of military force.

In addition, economic sanctions should be custom-designed in order to meet the
specific objectives of each individual case. No "cookie-cutter" approach to the
application of economic sanctions can ever be successful since both the American foreign
policy goals as well as the target nation's economic vulnerabilities vary from case to
case. For example, a boycott of oil exports from Cuba would be about as effective as a
boycott of sugar imports from Iraq. And, sanctions need to be applied to the most
vulnerable areas of the target's economy so as to have the greatest impact on the target
nation's political leadership . (Schott , 1998: 2).
However, America fails to tailor its use of economic sanctions on a case-by-case
basis and broadly applies economic sanctions as its foreign policy 'band-aid' . A foreign
policy 'band-aid' favored by American policy makers mainly since they provide a middle
of the road option located somewhere between doing nothing at all, diplomatic protests
and negotiations and the use of military force . Economic sanctions also make an
attractive choice for American policy makers because they are willing to suffer the
negative effects of economic sanctions on American businesses and the American
economy more than they are willing to suffer the negative repercussions of a military
engagement with the targeted country. (i.e. Vietnam and Korea). Yet, with the exception
of Cuba and North Korea (where economic sanctions followed failed attempts to use
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military force), economic sanctions have only recently been used by the US as one step
along the foreign policy path towards overt military aggression.
The ineffectiveness of recent economic sanctions has forced America's political
leadership to approve the use of military force in countries like Panama, Haiti, Soma! ia,
Iraq, Libya and Kosovo. And the use of military force was approved either to reinforce
the message being sent through the application of economic sanctions or to coerce the
target nations to finally abide by US foreign policy demands. During Operation Desert
Storm against Iraq for example, President George Bush deemed it necessary to deploy the
US military against Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard. A decision that President
Bush made following the inability of the year-old US-imposed economic sanctions to
force Saddam into withdrawing his troops from Kuwait. (Schott, 1998: 2).

The Costs
Next , even though it is difficult to pin down the benefits associated with the use of
economic sanctions, it is fairly easy to track down the costs. Economic sanctions not
only deprive the sender (the US) of potential profits from lost international trade
transactions, but also harm corporations working in the export industry of the sender.
Such export-oriented corporations are among some of the most productive businesses in
the American economy today. Additionally, as the American use of economic sanctions
has expanded over the past century, tensions have increased between the US, her allies
and the other industrialized nations of the world.
In fact, many American businesses constantly complain through the American
media that the effects of unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the US go beyond
their intended targets, beyond the economic sectors of the target nation. And that the
negative effects of the sanctions are often felt by American companies long after the
sanctions are lifted. The negative effects of economic sanctions country are often felt
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harder by American companies when they earn a reputation for being "unreliable
suppliers" shortly after economic sanctions are imposed. For example, sanctioned
nations may avoid buying from US companies even after sanctions are lifted and
continue to trade only with non-US companies to avoid risking the economic deprivation
that they experienced immediately following the initial application of American
sanctions. Such prejudice against American companies places them at a distinct
disadvantage in international markets in which they must constantly compete against
foreign competitors.
In any event, exports sales lost today by American companies may also mean
lower exports even after the sanctions are lifted. This could happen if the US companies
are not be able to supply intermediate manufactured goods and replacement parts for
factories and machinery sold to the target nation by foreign competitors during the course
of the sanctions. Foreign firms that supply intermediate manufactured goods and
replacement parts have been known to intentionally design their final product s without
American-made parts in order to maintain a monopoly in the target nation 's market once
economic sanctions are lifted .
In a $7 trillion dollar US economy, the potential costs incurred by American
companies, as a direct result of US sanctions imposed against other countries may not be
great, but they are felt. Often, the negative effects of US economic sanctions on US-

based companies are concentrated in sectors and felt by businesses that focus on
international trade and investment. And, unfortunately for the American economy, these
companies are often the most competitive and well off in the US.
In fact, according to Kim Elliott, workers in plants involved in exporting are more
productive and more highly compensated than are the workers of comparable companies
that do not export their goods. In addition, employment growth is nearly 20 percent
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higher in exporting companies and plants than in those that have never exported or have
stopped exporting their goods. And finally, another sign that export-oriented companies
are valuable to the American economy (and should be protected), is the fact that
exporting firms are less likely to go out of business in an average year (Elliott , 1997: 3).
And, as a result, are more likely to make stable contributions to America's GNP.
Therefore, with a rapidly changing and interdependent global economy, unilateral
economic sanctions have become decreasingly effective for the US government a foreign
policy option, while simultaneously becoming increasingly costly for American owned
companies. As a result, if sanctions are to have any chance at all of producing favorable
outcomes, they must be formatted on a case-by-case basis not only to negatively impact
the economy of the target nation, but also to protect the economic well being of American
companies . (Elliott, 1997: 3-4) .
The decline of sanctions as an effective American foreign policy tool

Perhaps many extemporaneous factors contributed to the decline in effectiveness
of US imposed economic sanctions, but a large part of the explanation must be based on
the ever-expanding economic interdependence that we have witnessed in the past few
decades on the world stage. Consequently, the United States has slipped from its onceheld position of global dominance in the world economy and its ability to gain economic
leverage against the other nations of the world is constantly declining. And, given that
the United States' slow, but inevitable slide from its once lofty position of global
economic dominance has continued during the past ten years, or even sped up, there is
little reason to expect that the effectiveness of American economic sanctions has
conversely improved. (Elliott, 1997: 2).
Therefore, the American attempts to punish foreign governments and pursue
policy changes through the imposition of economic sanctions is a foreboding signpost on
48

the road to global economic freedom and increased economic interdependence between
the world's economies. That the use of unilateral economic sanctions by the US has
actually increased in recent decades is a sure sign that America's diplomatic relations
with both our major trading partners and the target nations are in jeopardy.
In many instances, American-imposed economic sanctions jeopardize diplomatic
relations because they send a contradictory message regarding US beliefs . For example,
the underlying messages that lay behind the use of economic sanctions go against
America's stated belief in a free market economy, as well as the positive influence of
private investment in target nations. When American policy makers state on the one
hand how much American trade will positively influence the domestic policies of China
and Vietnam, while simultaneously denying that American trade with Cuba will have the
same effect, they are sending a contradictory message. In addition, claims that US trade
will not positively influence countries like Cuba also fail to recognize the fact that
American companies like Coke or Ford help to foster greater economic freedom , as well
as promote 'American' ideals to the people of America's trading partners around the
world.
In addition to sending a contradictory message, economic sanctions are also a bad
foreign policy choice because they often do not work (they often fail to meet their stated
foreign policy goals). Out of the 78 cases of US imposed economic sanctions since
World War I, not a single example besides Columbia can be found where US unilateral
economic sanctions forced a target nation to change its basic political structure or
significant political policies . In fact , the 40 year old economic embargo of Cuba, a tiny
island nation less than 90 miles from the "soft underbelly" of America's southern
coastline, is a monument to the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions as a
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coercive foreign policy tool. And yet, the US still chooses to maintain unilateral
economic sanctions against a number of countries around the world.
To counter the anti-economic sanctions sentiment, some supporters of economic
sanctions point to South Africa as one instance where US economic sanctions where
successfully applied, even though the facts tell a different story. It is unrealistic to credit
an American Congress's vote for sanctions in October of 1986 with either the
effectiveness of the economic sanctions against South Africa or the overthrow of
Apartheid. Also, it is also unrealistic to credit the US with the success of the sanctions
against South Africa since it was not the economic pressure levied against South Africa
alone that forced the end to Apartheid.
On the contrary, the well-organized domestic political forces, after a threedecades-long struggle, were the ones that achieved the peaceful overthrow of a racist
system that had no moral ground to stand on. Those domestic efforts, combined with
pressure from multilateral economic sanctions and efforts of governrnents and local
communities around the world, finally forced the white-minority government to cave in
to political , social and economic pressures and loosen its death grip on political power in
South Africa. And yet, many American politicians look to the South African case of
economic sanctions as another reason why economic sanctions should be applied more
often. (Elliott, 1997: 3).
Even the goals of sanctions are misguided
The goals of US economic sanctions are often unrealistic and almost always
misguided . A bill seriously considered in the American Congress in 1996 would have
banned all investment in Burma (Myanmar) unless the President of the United States first
certified that an elected official of Burma had been allowed to take office. Clearly, the
details of the situation in Burma differ from those of other nations like Cuba. Yet, setting
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a standard that requires a trading partner to have an elected government in power, sets a
dangerous precedence . It sets a dangerous precedence not only since it encourages some
to speculate that US companies might some day be prevented from doing business in the
vast majority of countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, but also since it illustrates
one side of a two-faced American position. America's position regarding this matter
seems two-faced when we witness the normalization of trade relations taking place
between the US and countries like Vietnam and China while we simultaneously pursue
the imposition of economic sanctions against countries like Burma and Cuba.
Recently, even America ' s major trading partners have refused to support most
US-imposed economic sanctions. And they will almost certainly refuse to support any
future congressionally imposed ban similar to the one being proposed for Burma . This
should trouble America's political leadership since, to have any hope of effectiveness,
such a boycott would require the cooperation of China , Singapore and many other Asian
nation s. A level of international cooperation that America is not likely to receive.
In fact, Asian countries have chosen closer economic ties with Burma over
isolation , having invited Burma to participate in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations . Subsequently, as has happened elsewhere in the world, US unilateral sanctions
against Burma will serve primarily to transfer business from American owned companies
to foreign firms without accomplishing the important foreign policy goals that US
economic sanctions are legally based upon.
Contrary to the current practice, as the main economic characters playing out their
role on the international economic stage, American companies should be encouraged to
enter, not discouraged from entering new markets around the world. US foreign
investment is not only profitable for the American companies that invest wisely, it also
helps to foster greater economic growth and prosperity among their corporate employees
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living in the target nations. And, as a result, the companies that invest in target nations
help those nations advance their economic conditions, social atmosphere and political
practices from within via positive economic reinforcement, rather than from without,
through the negative economic impact of unilateral sanctions.
Examples of positive economic reinforcement are the companies that engaged in
long-term investment in Burma and other target nations and built schools, hospitals and
roads. These are services that the local governments could not have afforded on their
own. Then, in addition to providing economic benefits, American companies can also
simultaneously introduce the people of the target nation to the principles of peaceful
democratic reforms in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation rather than one of one
of fear and loathing .

WHY CHOOSE CUBA FOR THIS CASE STUDY
As previously mentioned, throughout history , economic sanctions have been
continuously used as coercive foreign policy tools. First, economic sanctions have been
used to protect economic and commercial interests when faced with 'unfair' international
competition . And second, they have been used in attempts to put pressure on target
nations . Pressure used to either influence the domestic political policy decisions of the
target nation or to destabilize the 'sultanistic' dictators or regimes that are seen as
'hostile' or 'unfriendly' by the nation imposing the sanctions. (Alerassool, 1993: 1).
However , as history has proven, economic sanctions have seldom been able to,
"roll back military aggression, have had a limited capacity to impair their targeted
regime's daily operations , or to force the targeted regime into changing its domestic
policies, and have never toppled a dictator." (Lopez, 1997: 70). Additionally, since the
effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions depends on so many variables over which
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the sanctioning country has little control, it is not surprising that sanctions often inflict
only minor and/or temporary economic damage on the target country .
Consequently, being unable to either inflict sufficient economic damage on the
target country's economy, or to obtain sufficient control over the target nation's policy
making process, the foreign policy goals of the country imposing the economic sanctions
cannot be achieved - and the sanctions fail. For, as Donald Losman stated, "economic
harm," resulting from economic sanctions , "must be translated through the target state's
political system and into policy or regime changes. But, to the degree that dictators like
Castro prevail, or charismatic leaders engender popular support in spite of (or often with
the aid of sanctions), the desired political changes rarely if ever occur." (Losman, 1979:
41).
Thus , with the inability of economic sanctions to attain their stated foreign policy
goals in mind , the author decided to study one case in which economic sanctions should
have worked. Therefore, after looking at the 'key vulnerabilities ' of various countries
targeted by US imposed economic sanctions, the author decided to study the case of US
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba .
Initially, the variables that set Cuba apart from the rest of the targeted nations
included its small size and population - thereby limiting its original prospects and ability
to conduct trade in the international market. Then, another variable that suggested to the
author that US economic sanctions should have worked, was its geographic location,
"within what has historically been considered America ' s backyard ." (Schwab, 1999:
167).
Located only 90 miles from the "soft underbelly" of the US, Cuba had become enveloped
by both the American trade markets and American companies with the US being
responsible for more than 68.9 percent of Cuba's total trade. (Wallensteen, 1983: 104).
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And finally, Cuba's over-reliance on sugar as its main export should have made it
extremely vulnerable to the initial American embargoes barring the exportation of Cuban
sugar to the US. And yet, even though Cuba seemed to have been 'ripe for the picking'
by US imposed sanctions, Fidel Castro remains in power nearly forty years later.
Indeed, no one would have faulted an American foreign policy scholar of the
1960s for suggesting that economic sanctions imposed by the US against Cuba should
effectively attain their foreign policy goals. With the US dominating the Cuban import
and export markets, the close proximity of Cuba to the US, the limited variety of
domestic production and the small number of trading partners, sanctions should have

succeeded. Therefore, the study of the American sanctions imposed against Cuba (the
Cuban case study) was chosen more for its inherent chances for early success than it was
for its long history of ineffectiveness.

In any case, if US imposed economic sanctions

should have worked anywhere, and against any country, they should have worked against
Cuba because of its economic vulnerabilities.

And, if the American sanctions had

worked against Cuba , the viability of economic sanctions as an effective foreign policy
tool would have been proven. However, Cuba does have a dictator, so one would not
expect sanctions to work there as effectively as they worked against countries with
democratic forms of government. (like Columbia).
However, if we find through this study that the American sanctions failed to work
(failed to attain their stated foreign policy goals) against Fidel Castro's Cuban regime,

through an especially vulnerable Cuban economy, then it is unlikely that they will work
anywhere else. Cuba was a good case to look at not only since Cuba was economically
vulnerable, but also since Castro's position as an authoritarian/sultanistic

dictator enabled

him to crush opposition that might have forced out the leadership in a more democratic
nation. Consequently, it should be easy to see why the author chose Cuba for this study.
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A study of the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions at attaining their stated foreign
policy goals.
First , the author chose the Cuban case to find out whether or not the stated foreign
policy goals of economic sanctions could be achieved if the sanctions are imposed
against a particularly vulnerable target. Second, the author chose the Cuban case for this
paper to prove that, even when the target country is potentially very vulnerable to the
negative economic effects of the sender's economic sanctions, economic sanctions are
unlikely to achieve their stated foreign policy goals. And finally, the author chose the
Cuban case for this study since the US sanctions against that country have had close to
forty years to attain their foreign policy goals. And, as logic suggests, if economic
sanctions have failed to achieve their foreign policy goals after nearly forty years,
chances are that the sanctions will not achieve them at all. For, according to Hufbauer,
Schott and Elliott, "successful economic sanctions lasted an average of only 2.9 years,
while sanctions that lasted longer than eight years tended to fail." (Hufbauer, et al, 1990:
1). In fact, only 21 % of the cases imposed in pursuit of even modest foreign policy goals
between 1973 and 1990 succeeded. (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 8).

Detailing the embargo: a table of the main facets and goals of the American
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba
The overarching goal of US policy toward Cuba is to promote a peaceful transition to
democracy in the island nation.
To that end, America's foreign policy efforts against Cuba are proceeding on the
following track:
• To place pressure on the regime for change through comprehensive economic
sanctions;
To
reach out to the Cuban people;
•
• To promote and protect human rights in Cuba;
• To support multilateral efforts that press for the democratization of Cuba; and
• To encourage migration-related agreements between Cuba and the US to promote the
safe, orderly and legal migration of Cubans to America.
What the US sanctions against Cuba allow:
► Food and medical sales to Cuban entities as well as the Cuban government (following
a July 21, 2000 vote by the American Congress).
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►

Humanitarian aid
Family reunification visits by all Cuban-Americans, once a year.
► Visits by licensed US citizens such as academics, journalists , artists , humanitarian
group members , and sports teams .
► Anyone sending up to $1200 a year to relatives or friends in Cuba, except senior
government or Communist Party officials .
► Direct flights from Miami, New York and Los Angeles.
► Direct telephone service.
What the US sanctions against Cuba ban:
► Cuban import s, except cultural materials such as books and Music CDs . People
returning from legal visits can bring back cigars and rum
► US investments or property purchases
► Exports of US products other than food or medicine
► World Bank and International Monetary Fund credits to Cuba , through Americanbacked vetoes in those agencies .
► Tourism-related travel to Cuba.
► Business deals by foreign subsidiaries of US-owned firms .
► Visits to US ports by ships that have docked in Cuba within the preceding 180 days .
► And foreign firms "trafficking" in US properties appropriated or nationalized by
Castro in the early 1960s.
Source: I) USAID <http ://www. usaid .gov/co untries /cu/mand-cub .htm>
2)The Miami Herald <http ://www. herald .com/herald /content /docs/085 l 26.htm >
►

Background on Cuba's historical ties to the US

On January 7, 1959, the government of the United States officially recognize d the
gove rnment of President Fidel Castro of Cuba. However , after the US refused to sign
trade agreements with Cuba, the Cuban government of Castro signed a trade agreement
with the USSR.

In this agreement the Soviet Union agreed to buy sugar, citrus and other

goods from Cuba as well as to supply Cuba with much needed crude oil. This agreement
was especially important to a Cuban industrial sector that is highly energy inefficient and
environmentally unfriendly .
Such "offsetting assistance", given to Cuba by the Soviet Union, eroded almost
immediately the chances for the success of any of the US sanctions imposed against
Cuba. Often referred to as the "black knight corollary" by Hofbauer, a third country like
the Soviet Union can quickly erode away the wall of economic deprivation constructed
by economic sanctions by providing financial aid to the target country. "Black Knight"
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aid is especially effective when the policy goals of the economic sanctions include the
destabilization of the target government as well as disruption of military expansionism
abroad. (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 5). Moreover , after the signing of the Soviet-Cuban trade
agreement, the US-Cuban relations deteriorated further in a downward spiral of imposing
tit for tat trade restrictions which finally ended with the US imposition of full economic
sanctions against Cuba in 1962.
Then, later in 1960, American oil firms stopped refining oil purchased from the
USSR on advice from the US State Department. Cuba responded to this refusal by
nationalizing the American-owned oil refineries. This Cuban nationalization of
American-owned factories , in tum, forced President Eisenhower to cancel the US import
quota of raw Cuban sugar. This was extremely painful for the Cuban economy since
Cuban sugar sales to the US up to that point were approximately 3 million tons each year
(more than half of Cuba ' s total sugar exports). In response, Cuba then expropriated and
nationalized all American-owned property within Cuba (valued at approximately $1
billion) while simultaneously initiating trade restrictions against the importation of all US
products . (Krinsky and Golove , 1993: 108; Newfarmer , 1982: 128; Schrieber, 1973: 387).
In response to Cuba's restriction on the importation of American goods, the US
decided to impose an embargo on all exports to Cuba except for medicine and food.
Then , in October of 1960, the US extended the embargo to cover all foreign subsidiaries
of American companies, reduced the American import quota for Cuban sugar to zero, and
vowed to prevent ships carrying goods to and from Cuba from carrying any cargo owned
by the US government. (Doxey, 1980: 35 ; Losman , 1979: 21,26) .
Next, in 1961, Castro realized that his best chance for economic survival was to
replace the American market with the market of the Soviet Union. To help with this
move, he claimed publicly to be a Marxist-Leninist whose government-led revolution
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was to be a socialist /ant-imperialist one. Following this statement, President Kennedy
severed all US-Cuban diplomatic relations, restricted the travel of American citizens and
residents to Cuba, and launched plans for the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion .
(Newfarmer, 1982: 128).
In January of 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted 20 to 1
(Cuba voting against) to declare that the Marxist-Leninist ideology is incompatible with
the inter-American system. As a result, a two-thirds majority decided that Cuba had
"voluntarily" left the OAS by declaring its Marxist-Leninist affiliation. (New York
Times, 31JAN62: A 1 quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 7).
Then, following the January decisions of the OAS, President John F. Kennedy
proclaimed by executive order that the US had banned virtually all imports of Cuban
goods . At that time, he also promised, "to do something about Castro, to destabilize the
Castro regime and cause its overthrow , or at a minimum , to make an example of the
regime by inflicting as much damage on it as possible ." (Newfarmer , 1982: 128-129) . In
tum , Kennedy's decision was followed by an OAS vote to suspend all military trade with
Cuba . And shortly thereafter, Cuba protested the OAS decision to the UN Security
Council and asked the UN to suspend the decision of the OAS , but the UN took no
action . (Doxey, 1980: 35) .
Later, in August 1962, the American Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act,
including an amendment banning aid to "any country which furnishes aid to the present
government of Fidel Castro in Cuba. This clause was further amended the next year to
order the withholding of foreign aid from countries that allow ships flying their national
flag to carry goods to and from Cuba." (Krinsky & Golove, 1993: 112-113). This action
was followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis which forced the US to tighten the ratchet of
sanctions another notch.
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During the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 23, 1962), OAS unanimously supported
the US "quarantine" of Cuba, and authorized members to take measures, including the
use of military forces, to ensure "hemispheric security". This allowed the US to justify
its naval blockade of Cuba's ports and the quarantine was not lifted until the end of the
Cuban Missile Crisis on November 20, 1962. (Doxey, 1980: 36).
Next, in February of 1963, President Kennedy ordered the prohibition of
shipments of cargoes paid for by the US government, on foreign-flag ships that have been
in Cuban ports. He also encouraged maritime unions to boycott ships named on the US
government blacklist because of their trade relations with Cuba. (Krinsky & Go love,
1993: 112-113). However, illicit trade with Cuba continued and President Kennedy felt
that he had no choice but to invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act which froze all
Cuban-owned assets in the US. The order to invoke the (TWEA) also transferred
enforcement of the US sanctions against Cuba from the Department of Commerce to the
Treasury Department.

And, under American pressure, NA TO countries agreed to halt

military trade with Cuba while being allowed to continue economic trade with Cuba.
(Krinsky & Golove, 1993: 114; Doxey, 1980: 3 7).
Most of the 1960's restrictions against Cuba, following Kennedy's assassination,
were based on Under Secretary of State George Ball's suggestion to revamp the purpose
of the economic sanctions. Ball proposed that the purpose of the sanctions against Cuba
be revamped to: 'reduce Castro's ability to export the communist insurgency that brought
Castro to power, to show the Cuban people that Castro cannot serve their interests, to
demonstrate that Communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere, and to raise the
costs to the Soviet Union of maintaining its sphere of influence over Cuba." (Doxey,
1980: 37).
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Then, in 1975, US-Cuban diplomatic talks towards normalization began after the
OAS lifted all collective sanctions against Cuba and the US decided to allow foreign
subsidiaries of American companies to trade with Cuba. (Lowenfeld, 1977: 32).
However, US-Cuban normalization talks ended when Cuba launched a large-scale
military intervention in Angola . As part of this intervention, Cuba deployed 36,000
troops to Angola followed by US threats of military action if Cuba ever sends more
troops to another country.
Later, in September of 1977, Cuba withdrew some of its troops from Angola and
established interests sections with the US in their respective capital cities . Following the
establishment of the interest sections, President Jimmy Carter (sarcastically called "the
peacemaker") proposed the establishment of a fishing agreement with Cuba, loosened
restrictions on travel to Cuba and opened discussions with Cuba on a wide array of
issues. Then, later that year, Congress repealed the provision of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 banning aid to countries permitting their cargo ships to carry goods to and
from Cuba. And, as a direct result of Congress's actions, the National Security Council
destroyed the "s hip blacklist ". (Newfarmer, 1982: 129; Krinsky & Go love, 1993: 118).
According to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence
Todman, "The Carter Administration had begun an effort to improve relations with Cuba,
but normalization was supposed to take a long time and depended on many factors ,
including Cuba's behavior in the international arena ... The United States desired
improved relations with Cuba, improvement in human rights in Cuba, the release of all
political prisoners (thousands of whom have been jailed for years), more responsible
international behavior by Cuba (especially in Africa), and compensation to US citizens
and companies whose properties were taken over by the Cuban government."
(Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, pp. 56-67). However, in Castro's opinion,
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Cuba had already offered to settle on a compensation package for the American-owned
properties, but the US refused to accept the terms of the deal.
Then, in 1980, Cuba broke from its conciliatory trend and sent 20,000 troops to
Ethiopia. The deployment of Cuban troops to Ethiopia as well as the discovery of a
Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba led President Carter to establish the Caribbean Joint
Task Force Headquarters in Florida and warn that Cuban troops would not be allowed to
deploy against neighboring countries . (Newfarmer , 1982: 130). Fidel decided to "thumb
his nose" at President Carter and initiated the raft armada of Cuban refugees from the
port of Mariel. Eventually, the flotilla of rafts, boats and ships carried almost 125,000
Cubans illegally across the 90 miles of ocean that lies between the shores of Cuba and
Florida. This event later became known as the "Mariel boatlift" .
Presid ent Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 and initiated tighter economic
sanction s again st Cuba . He also proposed Radio Marti (Radio Free Cuba) and claimed
that Cuba was the instigator behind the Marxist powers in Nicaragua, the communist
rebels in El Salvador and the military junta in Grenada. In tum Reagan later
characterized Grenada as a "virtual surrogate" of Cuba and attempted to regain Latin
Americ an cooperation against Castro. (Newfarmer, 11982 : 132; Shulz, 1983: 37).
According to former Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Enders, the Reagan
administration sought to tighten the noose of economic sanctions against Cuba , "in
response to the Cuban promotion of leftist revolution in Central America, especially El
Salvador." (Washington Post, l 5DEC8 l: A6 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 9).
Therefore, knowing the tradition of the Reagan Administration (Irangate / Iran-Contra
Scandal), it is easy to see how important it was to President Reagan to stop the spread of
communism (The Evil Empire) in Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean.
Following the Reagan era, the objectives of the US economic sanctions against Cuba
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have been often categorized under two main headings: the overthrow of Castro and the
containment of the spread of communism in Latin America. (Roca, 1987: 87).
In 1984, the United States and Cuba negotiated an agreement to resume norn1al
immigration activities interrupted after the Mariel "boatlift", and to return people to Cuba
from the "boatlift" that were then excludable under US immigration laws. However,
Cuba decided to suspend this agreement in May of 1985 after the US finally got Radio
Marti off the ground and began to broadcast anti-Castro information to Cuba. But, the
agreement was accepted once again by Cuba after it began jamming Radio Marti
broadcasts with the aid of the Soviet-made version of America's "Compass Call" (a radio
transmission jamming platform). And yet, today, Radio Marti has attracted a large
following of its short-wave radio broadcasts . (US Dept. Of State, 1998: 7)
In 1985, following Angola's announcement that it was willing to pha se out the
Cuban troop presence in return for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, Castro
stated that he would accept US mediation efforts in the region. Castro also stated that the
number of Cuban troops stationed in Ethiopia had been reduced to a "symbolic level".
As a result, his comments seemed to indicate that there would be a substantial lowering
of the Cuban military's presence in Africa. This reduction took place , both as popular
support of Cuba within those countries waned, and as the Soviet Union's own "sphere of
influence" withdrew from Africa . (Washington Post , 6FEB85: Al as quoted in Hutbauer,
et al, 1990: 9).
In 1988 and 1989, Cuba seemed to have wanted to renew talks with the US about
improving the two countries' bilateral relationship. In 1988, Cuba, Angola and South
Africa reached an agreement under which Cuban troops were to leave Angola, and South
Africa was to withdraw troops from Namibia and implement a UN plan for a transition to
an independent Namibian nation. (US Dept. of State, 1998: 16). Then, in 1989, Castro
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offered to cooperate in slowing drug trafficking in an apparent attempt to improve
relations with the US. That same year, as President George Bush campaigned for a
Cuban-American congressional candidate in Miami, Florida, he stated that he would like
to normalize relations with Cuba also, but not until, "it reforms its political system and
ends its history of human rights abuses." (Washington Post, 22JAN90: A I as quoted in
Hufbauer, et al, I 990: 10). However, political upheaval, and the failure of attempted
economic reforms disrupted Soviet trade with Cuba and the US decided to take a "wait
and see approach" to the events in the USSR before pursuing Bush's comments any
further.
Then, in 1990, President Bush threatened to veto a bill that contained a provision
to ban foreign subsidiaries of American companies from doing any business with Cuba,
potentially affecting almost $320 million in annual trade for the US. Rumor had it that
Canada and the United Kingdom had expressed strong opposition to the extraterritorial
nature of the proposed measure. (International Trade Reporter, 21 NOV 1990: 1770).
Following this action from President Bush, Castro completely withdrew his Cuban troops
from Angola and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he would withdraw
all Soviet troops from Cuba. (Washington Post, 24MA Y9 I: A39 as quoted in Hufbauer,
et al, 1990: I 0).
Then, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, Russia ended
its economic assistance to Cuba, including subsidized oil sales. (Christian Science
Monitor, 9JAN92: 1). Prior to which action, Castro almost prophetically stated that:
"For decades our (Cuban) plans were based on the existence of several socialist
countries in Eastern Europe in addition to the Soviet Union, with whom we have
signed agreements and established extensive economic relations. We do not
know what kind of governments these countries will install. We have no security
as to what trade will be like for us in the future, and we have complete uncertainty
for the period of 1991-95 (After the current 'five-year plan' runs out)." (Financial
Times, 03MAR90: 6).
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The Cuban economy did suffer a dramatic drop following the Soviet collapse and Cuba's
economic security remained extremely vulnerable as Castro predicted. And yet, Castro
was able to remain in power even after the Cuban economy's collapse . He remained in
power in spite of the negative effects caused by the US economic sanctions by repressing
any opposition mounted against him as a result of frustration caused by the lagging
Cuban economy.
Next , in 1992, presidential candidate Bill Clinton pledged to support the Cuban
Democracy Act while on a Florida campaign stop . In response to this pledge, George
Bush issued an executive order restricting access to US ports of third-country ships that
have carried cargo to and from Cuba. Further , in order to limit Cuba's hard currency
earnings, President Bush permitted direct air charters to resume service between Cuba
and the US . These air charters, used for humanitarian shipments, prevented the Cuban
government from charging high fees for package s of US origin routed through Mexico .
(International Trade, 22APR92: 717).
Representative Robert Torricelli (D-N.J .) followed Bush's executive order
regarding air charter flights to Cuba in September of 1992 with the introduction of the
Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). The bill passed both the House (276-135) and the Senate
(61-24) and forbade foreign subsidiaries of US companies from dealing with Cuba . The
bill also prohibited any ship that had docked in Cuban harbors from entering any US
ports for at least 180 days and called for a tern1ination of aid to any country that provided
economic assistance to Cuba. However, the legislation encouraged reaching out to the
Cuban people and permitted reducing certain sanctions (namely telecommunications) "in
carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba." (Inside US
Trade, 9OCT92: 8) But the CDA faced immediate opposition from the UK and Canada
when those two countries barred any US subsidiaries within their borders from
64

complying with the CDA requirements. (Inside US Trade I 6OCT92: 11; Journal of
Commerce, 22OCT92: 4A) .
Later that same year, Russia signed a series of new trade agreements with Cuba,
including a new oil-for-sugar agreement, under which Russia was expected to deliver 2.3
million tons of oil in exchange for 1.5 million tons of sugar in 1993. This is down from
13 million tons of oil in 1990 and 10 million tons in 1991. (Christian Science Monitor,
9JAN92: 1). This newer agreement altered severely the previous deal that Cuba had held
with the former Soviet Union.
As part of the Cuban trade agreement with the former Soviet Union, Russia was
supposed to buy Cuban sugar at a price well above that of the world standard while
simultaneously selling oil to Cuba at a greatly discounted price. Cuba was reeling from
the American move to cut off all sugar purchases and was lucky that the Soviet Union
stepped in to take up the slack that the US left. However, Cuba was not the grateful
customer that the Soviet Union might have otherwise hoped .
On average, Cuba needed at least IO million tons of Soviet crude oil annually to
fuel its inefficient industrial complex throughout the 1970s and 1980s. And yet , in
addition to the required 10 million tons, Cuba would regularly purchase another three or
four million tons of extra discounted Soviet crude oil. This discounted crude oil, in tum,
would then be resold on the world market in order to increase Cuba's hard currency
reserves . Then , in order to insulate himself from the negative effects of the US economic
sanctions, Castro hoarded the hard currency reserves in "protected" accounts outside of
normal Cuban economic channels. (Hufbauer , et al, 1990: 6).
However, by the end of 1992, international tolerance of the American economic
sanctions against Cuba waned. One example of this took place in November of 1992
when the UN General Assembly voted 59 to 3, with 79 abstentions, to urge the lifting of
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the economic sanctions against Cuba. Only Romania and Israel joined the US in
opposing the UN condemnation of the sanctions. And , as mentioned earlier in this paper,
by 1997 only Israel consistently voted with the US in favor of the sanctions. (Washington
Post, 29NOV92: C6 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 12).
After recognizing the increased international opposition to the sanctions, the
Clinton administration announced that it was going to allow American phone companies
to improve phone service between Cuba and the US. Clinton initially approved the
installation of advanced telecommunication lines since the US sanctions had not been
able to prevent contact between Cuban-Americans and their relatives in Cuba with the
old phone system in place. In addition to having been able to maintain contact with
relatives back in Cuba, thousands of exiles have been able to go to Cuba to visit relatives
over the years along with scholars and academics that were allowed to travel to maintain
contacts with their Cuban counterparts. Consequently , the frequency of Cuban-American
contacts has increased only after the Cuban Democracy Act legally "pushed" for the
improvement of the phone system between the two countries. A move that was made in
order to improve and foster personal contacts between the citizens of the two nations.
However, President Clinton's move to improve the phone services was criticized
by Fidel's younger brother and vice-president, Raul Castro . Raul denounced the US
telephone policy as a "rotten carrot" and exhorted Cubans to resist it. Referring to
Clinton's move to improve telecommunications links between Cuba and the US, Raul
stated that, "we are not sitting with our arms crossed, we are ready and prepared to reply
in this politico-ideological area, to confront it in every dimension." (Reuters News
Service, l 8NOV95: 17 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 12). Then, following Raul's
policy announcement, foreigners that had met with dissidents in Cuba were expelled from
that country and the Cubans whom they had contacted were harassed. The Castro regime
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also used a new tactic to inhibit contacts between dissidents and foreign visitors and
relatives . Thi s new tactic is to banish dissidents to the provinces, and away from Havana.
(Lopez, 1997: 242).
Then, in 1994, food shortages in Cuba led to political unrest, which in tum
resulted in large numbers of refugees attempting to emigrate to the US . In response ,
reversing previous favorable treatment policies regarding the entry of Cuban immigrants
into the US, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) barred the entry of
Cuban refugees fleeing the island by sea and began to intern them at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base in southeastern Cuba. Eventually, the US government detained more than
27,000 Cubans at Guantanamo and nearly 10,000 Cubans in Panama. Furthermore, in
response to Cuba's refusal to limit the number ofrefugees fleeing Cuba , Clinton
tightened controls on travel to Cuba and banned the disbursement of money from the US
by Cuban -Americans to their relatives living in Cuba . (Washington Post , 9SEP94: A 17;
10OCT94 : Al3 ; 8MAR95: Al8 as quoted in Hufbauer , et al: 1990: 12-13) .
In September of 1994, Cuba and the US signed an immigration agreement to limit
the number of refugees allowed to leave Cuba for the US. The US decided that it would
not accept refugees who came to the US by sea, but agreed to grant at least 20,000
immigrant visas at its diplomatic offices in Havana each year, up from an average of
11,000 issued annually over the previous decade . (Financial Times, 26SEP95: 2) .
The Cuban National assembly, in tum, passed a foreign investment law that
allows foreign companies and individuals, including Cuban exiles, to own 100 percent in
Cuban investments. This removed the previous restriction requiring that all foreign
investments in Cuba be joint venture investments. All sectors, except for health,
education, arid defense were opened up to foreign investment by this new policy.
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However, foreign employers were still required to hire employees through the
Cuban government and to pay employees in dollars through the government , which in
tum pays the employees in pesos. (Economist, 9SEP95: 45). Usually, the salary paid by
the foreign firm equals approximately $450 each month for each employee. And yet, the
employee still only receives the equivalent of$ l O per month in Cuban pesos. As a result,
by keeping the salaries paid by the foreign investors in American dollars, the Cuban
government has been able to find still another source of hard currency to build up its
reserves. (Economist, 9SEP95: 45).

Introduction to the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 (also known as the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act or the Libertad Act of 1996)
In October of 1995, President Clinton eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for
educational, religious, and human rights purposes. But the move was strongly criticized
by anti-Castro members of Congress, who testified that travel agencies were scheduling
"humanitarian " hunting trips to get around legal restrictions barring tourist travel to
Cuba. As a result of such attempts to circumvent the legal restrictions placed on travel
between the US and Cuba, these same members of Congress pledged to redouble their
efforts to tighten sanctions on Cuba. (Ross-Lehtinen, House, 5MAR95: 5-7). In fact,
Senator Jesse Helms stated in May of 1995 that the Helms-Burton Act would do just that.
According to Helms, the Helms-Burton Act would tighten the sanctions against Cuba if
the American Congress would pass it and President Clinton would sign it into law. Later,
Helms also state that, "Fidel Castro is a tyrant. What keeps him in power is money (hard
currency) from the outside. The LIBERT AD Act will choke off that Castro
bonanza ... the life support system that has kept him in power all these years, and force
him out of power." (United States Information Service [USIS] 22MA Y95).
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However, the "tit for tat" restrictions, measures and attacks exchanged by the US
and Cuban governments escalated on February 24, 1996 when a Cuban MiG-29 fighter
plane shot down two American civilian aircraft in international airspace. The two planes
that were shot down were owned by a Cuban-American exile group called "Brothers-tothe-Rescue" and no one on board either of the two airplanes survived. In reaction ,
President Clinton condemned the action, suspended charter travel to and from Cuba, and
pledged to reach a rapid agreement on the Helms-Burton Act. (New York Times
27FEB96: Al; Washington Post, 27FEB96: A8 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 13).
Then, in March of 1996, President Clinton and the American Congress held true
to their words and the Senate passed a compromise version of the Helms-Burton or
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERT AD) by a vote of 74 to 22 . A
similar measure had passed the House the previous September, but had stalled in the
Senate because of opposition from the US State Department as well as major US allies
(Canada, Mexico , United Kingdom, and Japan). (New York Times, 6MAR96: A7). But
on March 6, 1996, the House of Representatives passed the revised legislation 336 to 86
and President Clinton signed the bill into law on March 12. (Washington Post , 7MAR96:
A30 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 14).
The main reason behind the establishment and passing of the Helms-Burton Act
was that it was supposed to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba. As Assistant
Secretary of State, Alan Larson put it in 1999:
"Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy and respect for
human rights in Cuba in four ways: first, pressure on the government through
economic sanctions and measures delineated in the 1996 Libertad Act ; Second ,
reaching out to and supporting Cuban people to encourage the development of a
civil society; third, cooperation with the Cuban government on interests of direct
concern, particularly to maintain migration in safe, orderly and legal channels;
and forth, forging a multilateral alliance with the nations of the rest of the world
to press for democratic change in Cuba, respect for human rights, and
development of independent civil society." (United States Information Service
[USIS], 11MAR99: 119).
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A key mechanism by which the Helms-Burton Act is supposed to contribute to a
transition to democracy is by tightening the economic sanctions and thereby reducing the
hard currency left available to the Castro government. This reasoning was given by
President Clinton when he signed the Helms-Burton bill into law as well as by
congressional supporters of the Act. And the same justification has been repeated time
and again by officials of the Clinton Administration throughout the years since the
Helms-Burton Act was passed. (Lopez, 1997: 238).
Details of the Helms-Burton Act
The Helms-Burton Act has four titles. Title I codifies (makes into law) existing
federal regulations and reaffirms the sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act as
well as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. Importantly, Title I and II have provisions
for presidential waivers, while Title IV does not.
Title I seeks to strengthen international sanctions against Cuba and the Castro
government the most. Among the various sections of Title I is the instruction to the
heads of US financial institutions to oppose loans to Cuba and Cuban members until the
country successfully transitioned to a democratic form of government. Title II states
mainly that the US government must prepare a financial aid plan for a transitional Cuban
government that is democratically elected in Cuba after Castro either dies or is removed
from power.
Next, Title III of the bill permits Americans with claims to property expropriated
by the Cuban government between 1959 and 1961 to sue foreign companies or
individuals that traffic in such property for damages in American courts. Trafficking is
defined in the legislation as the buying, selling, leasing, marketing or otherwise
benefiting from the use of expropriated American properties. President Clinton allowed
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Title III to become law, but has the authority to waive its enforcement as a law for
periods of six months. With this in mind, Clinton applied the national interest waiver and
suspended the enforcement of Title III for six months on July 16, 1996. (Financial Times,
17JUL96: I). Since that time, Title III has never been enforced. (Lopez, 1997: 239).
Under Title IV, the US must deny entry to the executives and major shareholders
of foreign companies, as well as their immediate families that are found to be trafficking
in expropriated property. The legislation also seeks to restrict US aid to independent
states of the former Soviet Union if they provide assistance for intelligence collection
facilities in Lourdes, Cuba. In addition, the Helms - Burton Act not only restricts aid to
any country that helps with the completion of the Cuban-Juragua nuclear power plant, but
also provides for presidential waivers for humanitarian aid or aid to promote market
reforms and democratization in Cuba. Foreign companies subjected to the effects of Title
IV can gain a reprieve by, "divesting from expropriated American properties." (Lopez ,
1997: 239). And so far, Title IV has only been applied to the two largest foreign
investors in Cuba. These two investors include Mexico's telephone powerhouse, Grupo
Domos and Sherritt International from Canada. (Lopez, 1997: 239).

ORA WING INTERNATIONAL FIRE
Since the 1996 passing of the Helms-Burton Act, Titles III and IV have drawn the
most international attention and criticism, especially from Mexico, Canada and the
European Union. These countries claim that the Helms-Burton Act, "violates trade
accords and is an infringement on the sovereignty of other countries by its
"extraterritorial" attempt to apply US laws to foreign-based companies." (Lopez, 1997
239). In fact, Canadian Trade Minister Art Eggleton announced that Canada planned to
seek consultations with the US under Chapter 12 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFT A) regarding the legality of the Helms-Burton Act as it is applied to
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sovereign nations. Then, joined by Mexican officials, Canadian officials also say that
they will try to include provisions in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
that would prevent the US from imposing its secondary sanctions on countries that trade
with Cuba. (Inside US Trade, 1OMAY96: 20-21; l 5MA Y96: 8).
Following the Canadian and Mexican objections, the Helms-Burton Act was
condemned by members of the UN, the OAS, and other international organizations.

The

34 members of the OAS passed a resolution without the US that declared the HelmsBurton Act illegal in that it, "does not conform to international law." (Financial Times,
29AUG96: 4). Then, after the OAS vote, the Mexican Congress overwhelmingly passed
a law that imposes fines of over $300,000 dollars on any Mexican companies that comply
with the law. (New York Times, 2OCT96: A9 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 15).
That action is followed by the European Union's Council of Ministers approval of antisanction legislation that forbids compliance with the Helms-Burton Act. EU-based
companies are prohibited from complying with the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act
unless they receive a waiver based on the grounds that refusing to comply with the
Helms-Burton Act will hurt either the company's or the EU's economic interests .
In addition, the EU stated that US court awards awarded under the provisions of
the Helms-Burton Act will not be recognized, and can be recovered by the EU if a
successful American plaintiff has property within EU boundaries. (European Union
News, 29OCT96). And finally, the Canadian Parliament followed up its previous protests
with legislation that penalizes Canada-based companies for obeying the American "Act".
The Canadian legislation also allows Canada's Attorney General to issue blocking orders
of US court judgments, as well as allowing Canadians to recover penalties lost.
(International Trade Reporter, 4DEC96: 1865).
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Consequently, it should be easy to see that the American government has gotten
into trouble with its main allies and trading partners because of the Helms-Burton Act.
Further, it should also be easy to see how the US, "has risked undermining the authority
of the World Trade Organization over the "Act" by maintaining that the law is conducive
to encouraging a democratic transition in Cuba." (Lopez, 1997: 239). Moreover , the
claims that the Helms-Burton Act helps to encourage Cuba to transition to a democratic
form of government have been harshly criticized by academics, government officials
from various governments as well as by Castro's own daughter. Criticisms that seem
justified since, according to Jimmy Carter, "the Helms-Burton Act is an obstacle to a
transition to democracy in Cuba," - a hindrance rather than a help. (Lopez, 1997: 239).

FINDINGS

The purpose of economic trade sanctions: The Cuban Case
Following the historical background of economic sanctions in general and US
economic sanctions against Cuba, this paper will next analyze how the US economic
sanctions imposed against Cuba have affected the Cuban economy. This is relatively
important to understand since authors like Losman have suggested that the political
purposes of economic sanctions (their foreign policy goals) can not be attained without
the sanctions first negatively impacting the economy of the target regime . Therefore, by
finding out how much the US economic sanctions imposed against Cuba negatively
affected the Cuban economy, we should be able to see that the economic damage was
insufficient to translate into the desired regime changes, political policy alterations or an
ideological reorientation.

And finally, after looking at the economic impact of the US

sanctions against Cuba, we will summarize the key points of this paper as well as state
the conclusions that the author has drawn from the evidence presented herein.

73

The Cuba taken over by Fidel Castro was not incredibly poor if compared to Latin
America in general. In fact , according to Donna Kaplowitz , Cuba had been among the
top three Latin American countries categorized by living standards in 1950. (Kaplowitz ,
1998 : 27). However , the problem with Cuba was that its society had begun to stagnate.
It had stopped its relative economic progression . In fact, Cuba's GNP was close to the

same in 1950 that it had been in 1925. A situation caused in large part to the dramatic
increase in the Cuba population without an accompanying increase in sugar production.
As a result, the flat economy led to widespread frustration among the Cuban people as
well as a desire for change. A desire for change that helped Fidel Castro come to power
in Cuba as well as fueled his attempts to transform the Cuban economy. (Kaplowitz ,
1998: 27).
Unfortunately for Castro, the stagnate Cuban economy not only helped him come
into power in Cuba , but it also made Cuba highly vulnerable to US economic (trade)
sanctions. Trade sanctions can be applied by the country imposing them to restrict the
target nation's access to either import markets or export markets . Early on in the USCuban economic conflict , policy makers like presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John
F. Kennedy focused on the use of economic sanctions as a tool to give the US control
over the economic and political processes of Cuba by denying that target nation access to
key international trade markets. (Kaempfer, 1992: 65).
Obviously , knowing the vulnerabilities of the Cuban economy in 1961, it would
have seemed perfectly reasonable to assume that the American economic sanctions
imposed against Cuban imports and exports would have worked. It was the level of
American trade with Cuba that the US policy makers had the most control over and the
loss of which should have severely impacted the Cuban economy.
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Before the Castro-led revolution in Cuba in 1959, between 20 and 25 percent of
all Cuban land was owned by American sugar companies, half the arable land was used
for sugar crops, and the Cuban sugar industry employed more than 50,000 Cubans.
(Doxey, 1980: 38). Also, at that time, Cuba had an established road and railway system,
and domestic mineral resources like nickel, tin, and iron ore, but no domestic supply of
petroleum. Consequently, Cuban dependence on imported oil as well as on exported
sugar made Cuba potentially vulnerable to the negative effects of American economic
sanctions. (Doxey, 1980: 38).
Moreover, with sugar as the main export crop of Cuban domestic industry , the
Cuban economy lived and died by the fluctuations of the global sugar market. Thus,
following the embargo of Cuban sugar exports by the US in 1960, Cuba was forced to
both reevaluate, and dramatically change its foreign trade policy. Without the
exportation of sugar to the US, imports , "which accounted for approximately 35 percent
of Cuba 's gross national product (GNP) in 1959, could not be financed ." (Doxey, 1980:
38).
As a result, the Cuban government instituted import controls and the importation
of consumer goods declined by more than 44 percent in value between 1959 and 1962.
(Doxey, 1980: 38). This decline in imports was bad news not only for Cuban industrial
development, but also for the re-supply of intermediate parts and goods necessary for the
repair and maintenance of a Cuban industrial infrastructure that was largely of US origin.
The factories could not be repaired without the American parts and could not run without
American refined oil. In other words, even though Cuban trade with the rest of Latin
America declined following the imposition of US/OAS-backed economic sanctions, it
was the loss of the trade with the US that had the greatest potential to damage the Cuban
economy.
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However, according to Donna Kaplowitz, the central economic factor that made
Cuba potentially vulnerable to the negative effects of US sanctions was neither Cuba's
dependence on the production and exportation of sugar, nor the monopoly of 75 percent
of all Cuban land by the Sugar companies. Additionally, the lack of diversification of the
domestic industrial complex was also not a great threat. On the contrary, the key
vulnerability that had the greatest potential to cause economic harm to Cuba was the
overwhelming domination of the Cuban economy and Cuban trade by the US.
(Kaplowitz, 1998:29).
In fact, during the decade prior to Castro's take over of Cuba, almost two-thirds of
all Cuban trade was with the U.S. This should have been very troubling to Castro and his
newly appointed leadership since the chances for the success of economic sanctions
increase proportionately with the level of total trade done between the target country and
the nation imposing the sanctions. (Kaplowitz, 1998: 30). In fact, according to Cole
Blasier and Carmelo Mesa Lago, Cuba imported between 60 and 65 percent of its total
imports from the US . And, by 1959, the US bought more than 69 percent of Cuba's
exports. (Blasier & Mesa-Lago , 1979: 184). "Moreover, in that same year, US interests
in Cuba produced more than 40 percent of Cuba's total raw sugar crop ... controlled over
90 percent of Cuban public utilities .... 50 percent of Cuba's railways ... and held more
than 25 percent of Cuba's bank deposits." (Kaplowitz, 1998: 30).
Consequently, at the time the embargo was originally imposed against Cuba, the
US accounted for a significant level of Cuba's international trade. A level considered to
be significant since Cuba imported between 60 and 65 percent of its imports from the US,
while America bought more than 69 percent of Cuba's total exports (Blasier & MesaLago, 1979: 184). And this was especially difficult for both the Cuban economy and the
Cuban dictator as he tried to institute economic reforms friendly to his newly found
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socialist ideological beliefs. For, as illustrated by Graph# 2 (See Appendix 2, Graphs),
international trade in general brought in more than $1500 million pesos each year to the
Cuban economy .
However, the weakness of unilateral economic sanctions (like the US embargo
imposed against Cuba) is that they fail to take into account the complexities of trade in
the international economic arena . On both the import and export sides of the target
nation's trade , there are likely to be substitutes available to replace the trade inhibited by
the sender ' s sanctions. This is true since, for virtually all traded goods, there are several
countries that can produce a certain good and can serve as an alternate trading partner for
the target nation . "Furthermore , the laws of comparative advantage suggest that even if
an alternative supply source is currently not available to the target nation among its
remaining trading partners , at least one of these partners is likely to be able to begin the
production and exportation of the good in question, if at a slightly higher cost to the
target." (Kaempfer , 1992: 65).
The availability of alternate supply sources is evident in the Graph entitled Cuba 's total
import s by country of orig in presented below. Albeit , the Graph covers a four-year period of

trade that took place almost 36 years after the sanctions were originally imposed against Cuba,
but that is not important. What is important, is the fact that the Graph shows an increase in
Cuba's level of imports from a variety of countries of origin (including the United Kingdom ,
Romania , Singapore, Belgium/Luxembourg and Japan) . In addition, the Graph also shows an
increase in the millions ($US) of dollars of trade being carried out by Cuba while under the
effects of an American trade embargo. In other words, even though the period of time covered in
the Graph took place long after the US sanctions were imposed against Cuba, it more importantly
illustrates the increased ability of Cuba to import the goods that it needs from abroad in spite of
the American embargo.
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percent of Cuban exports , by 1962 Cuban trade with the US was negligible . This level of
trade was not only replaced by the countries of the former Soviet Union , but it was also
surpassed as the Communist countries came to account for almost 82 percent of Cuba 's
export trade and 85 percent of Cuba's import trade. (Doxey , 1980:39).
In addition , as we can also see from Graph # 4 (see Appendix 2), the main trading
partners from the Communist countries included : the USSR , China, Czechoslovakia ,
Bulgaria , Romania , Yugoslavia and other smaller communist nations . To stimulate this
increasing trade relationship, the Soviet Union signed an agreement early in 1960 to buy
2.7 million tons of sugar initially and to increase purchases after the US placed a total ban
on the importation of Cuban sugar to the US. (Doxey, 1980: 39). As a result, relations
between the Soviet Union and Cuba became very close and a long-term trade agreement
signed in 1963 increased the amount of Soviet sugar imports from Cuba by a million tons
each year to a maximum of 5 million tons imported from Cuba in 1968. (Doxey , 1980:
39).
As a typical developing nation , Cuba has always been highly dependent on
foreign trade . This dependence , though , was increasin gly evident in Cuba since so much
of Cuba ' s land was devoted to the planting and growing of an inexpensive export crop
like sugar. And , unfortunately, Cuba still has to import much of the food, oil, and
intermediate industrial products that it needs. (Kaplowitz , 1998: 31).
Next , between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s , annual imports equaled between
22 percent and 32 percent of the Cuban GNP (as illustrated by Graph# 5), while exports
accounted for 8 to 12 percent. "In 1958, for example , more than 57 percent of Cuba's
GNP went to foreign trade. In comparison, in other small Latin American countries,
imports made up approximately only 25 percent." (Kaplowitz, 1998: 31). Furthermore,
to place Cuban trade into a better perspective, US imports and exports account for less
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than 10 percent of America's GNP. (Kaplowitz, 1998: 31 ). Highly dependent on foreign
trade , the level of importance of foreign trade to the Cuban economy (as also shown by
graph # 5) shows further just how vulnerable Cuba should have been to the negative
influences of US economic sanctions .
And yet, as Graphs # l - 5 show, high dependence does not guarantee the success
of economic sanctions.

According to Peter Wallensteen, target nations had an average

level of 32 percent dependence in cases where economic sanctions were successful,
whereas ineffective sanctions were applied against countries with 27 percent dependence.
(Wallensteen, 1983: 104 ). However, some highly dependent states like Cuba ,
successfully withstood the pressure of US imposed economic sanctions.
As a result, we need to take the analysis a step further and look at the actual

reduction of trade caused by the application of economic sanctions. "Calculating this
reduction during the first year of sanctions (which in some cases is the only year of
sanctions) we find an average reduction of approximately 13 percent." (Wallensteen ,
1983 : 105).
The picture illustrated by Wallensteen's following table is quite clear - economic
sanctions have not achieved a complete reduction of trade in any single case.
Consequently , it would be foolish to believe that sanctions could completely reduce trade
since few states are so dependent on certain trading partners that they can not find
alternate suppliers to meet their trading needs. Even Cuba , a country that was overly
dependent on the US for trade, was able to find alternative trading partners shortly after
the economic sanctions were put in place against it.
The first explanation for Cuba ' s ability to find alternative-trading partners is that
the US was unable to cut off all trade. In the case of Cuba, this happened because all
transactions between Cuba and the Soviet Union could not be stopped without resorting
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to the use of a military blockade of the island. The second and more important
explanation is not based on the inability of the US to halt Cuba ' s international trading.
Rather, the second reason is that Cuba had been able to find new trading partners willing
to both support and trade with it either as an available market or as an ideological brother.
In the Cuban case , Cuban exports to the US were almost entirely replaced by sales
to the Soviet Union. However, this can be seen , as a particularly peculiar fact when we
realize that one of the reasons for American sanctions imposed against Cuba was the
already increasing trade with the Soviet Union . At the time , US policy makers claimed
that an increase in the level of Soviet-Cuban trade might result in lost sales for American
companies to Cuba . However, unfortunately for the American policy makers , what
happened after the imposition of sanctions was a dramatic intensification of an already
intense situation. (Wallensteen, 1983: 106).

Actual Reduction of Target Nations' Total Trade
Reduction of total trade at end of first year of sanctions, calculated as percentage of total
trade the year before sanctions were imposed
Total Reduction in Percent
Receiver
7
Soviet Union
32
Italy
NIA.
Israel
13
Yugoslavia
5
Cuba
21
Dominican Republic
0
South Africa
7
Albania
+2
Portugal
31
Rhodesia
Source: Wallensteen, 1983: 105

Following Cuba's increased trade with the former Soviet Union and the collapse
of trade with the US, a government like Castro's should have been politically vulnerable
to the negative effects of the economic sanctions. Granted, it could be said that the full
effects of sanctions are not usually felt during the first year. And further stated that, if
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only the sanctions were applied for a long time, the impact would be greater. The
information presented in the previous table would suggest just the opposite. In fact,
Wallensteen's table suggests that, the longer economic sanctions were imposed against
Cuba, the weaker their economic impact. And the weaker the economic impact, the less
likely that the negative economic effects of the sanctions will translate directly into
desired political changes made by the target regime.

Conclusion
From this brief look into the condition of the Cuban economy both prior to and
during the US imposed economic sanctions, it is evident that Cuba should have been
vulnerable to the negative effects of the American sanctions . For, as we saw earlier, the
US provided more than 60 percent of Cuba's imports prior to the sanctions, thereby
controlling the supply of many important raw materials as well as intermediate goods
necessary for the maintenance of Cuba's industrial sector. Meanwhile, during that same
period , the US imported more than 68 percent of Cuba's exports, making Cuba dependent
on the American purchase of Cuban-produced goods. Additionally , we also saw that the
US purchased more than half of Cuba's main product: sugar.
The "overwhelming" domination of Cuban trade by the US discussed earlier was
increased significantly by Congressionally set import quotas used to increase Cuba's
dependence on the US as its main trading partner. And yet, time and again, Cuba has
been able to overcome the negative effects of the American sanctions as well as maintain
its ability to defy the cries of US policy makers. The same policy makers that we see
periodically on the news demanding the ouster of Fidel Castro from his seat of power in
Cuba, the democratization of the Cuban political system, and the improvement of Cuba's
human rights record.
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The American policy makers and political leadership from Eisenhower to Clinton
may very well have been disappointed by the fact that Castro has been able to withstand
the negative effects of the US sanctions imposed against Cuba. Furthermore, in spite of
the continuous efforts of politicians like Representative Dan Burton and Senator Jesse
Helms , Castro has been able to prevent the US from reclaiming Cuba as its economic and
political "protectorate". Moreover , Castro 's very survival in the face of such staunch
political opposition and lengthy economic sanctions , gives him a level of gravitates on
the world stage as an actor who has stood up to the class bully (the world's only
remaining superpower) and refused to give in to its demands (Schwab, 1998: 169).
As Margaret Doxey has stated," sanctions have regularly been used as a
supplement to the use of force in war and have also been used to influence the foreign
and domestic policies of target states," (Doxey, 1980: 3), in the place of military
aggression. But it is only since the increased economic interdependence in the global
marketplace that economic sanctions have become a foreign policy tool to be used alone,
separated from the use of military force. Realizing the fact that sanctions were preferable
to the use of force since they do not involve a risk to the lives of the citizens of the
country imposing the sanctions (especially after the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion), US
policy makers felt that the application of economic sanctions against Cuba was their best
option. And yet, since global economic interdependence undermines unilaterally
imposed sanctions, this development seems rather odd.
However, as many contemporary experts agree, American economic sanctions
have been ineffective at attaining their stated foreign policy goals. According to
sanctions scholar, James Blessing , "it can be argued that .. .neither the suspension of aid
nor the use of economic sanctions have been effective mechanisms of inducing behavior
change," in the target nations. (Blessing, 1981: 533). Perhaps, they have been
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ineffective because the policy makers imposing them have failed to follow the advice of
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott when they stated that, "If it (sanctions) were done , when 'tis
done , then 'twere well it were done quickly." (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 6).
This statement concisely presents the main problem with the case of the American
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba. That the heavy and slow hand of the close to
four decades old sanctions have invited both the evasion of Cuba's international trading
partners and the mobilization of domestic and international Third World opinion in
support of Castro . For, as we have already learned , Castro ' s Cuban government has been
able to find both alternate suppliers for the goods that it needs as well as alternate buyers
of the goods that it produces domestically almost since day one of the American
embargo. Meanwhile, the slow and drawn out imposition of the American sanctions
against Cuba has allowed Castro to strengthen his domestic and international support
base as he marshals the citizens of Cuba as well as the leaders of the world to his side .
(Hufbauer , et al, 1990: 6).
Castro , has become a political role model for sultanistic/ authoritarian dictators
around the world as well as for Cuban citizens at home . He has become a role model of
such international stature that the US has been unable to either understand or stop. To the
American political leadership, Castro is an puzzle, but to the other nations targeted by US
economic sanctions (Iraq, Iran, Libya) and their citizens whom resent, " America's postcold war imperialism and intrusive policies, he stands alone as a beacon , though in many
ways an overshadowed one." (Schwab , 1998: 169).
In any event, the inverse relationship between the effectiveness and the duration
of the economic sanctions argues against a strategy of slowly applying more and more
economic restrictions through the application of economic sanctions over time until the
target caves in. Time afforded Cuba the opportunity to find alternative suppliers and
84

buyers , to build new economic relationships with the countries of the former Soviet
Union, and to mobilize domestic support for its policies . For, sanctions that are long and
drawn out like the American sanctions imposed against Cuba allow the target nation to
overcome the "key vulnerabilities" that made it an attractive target in the first place.
(Hufbauer et al, 1990: 1). Therefore , based on the previous information, it should be easy
to see why the American sanction imposed against Cuba are ineffective and no longer
stand a chance of successfully attaining their stated foreign policy goals.
Initially , Cuba was able to overcome its lack of diversification of domestic
production by retooling its industrial complex with non-US intermediate parts. This
action removed the Cuban reliance on the US for those parts while simultaneously
allowing it to begin to produce a variety of new products (like the production of
refrigerators shown in Graph# 6). Secondly , Cuba was able to replace the
loss of trade with the US immediately following the application of sanctions against it.
Furthermore, with the level of trade with the US making up more than 60 percent of
Cuba's total imports and more than 68 percent of its total exports, it speaks well of
Castro's Cuban government that Cuba was able to make up for the lost trade so soon after
the sanctions were imposed . This ability of Cuba to find alternate trade partners is also
significant since foreign trade made up more than 40 percent of Cuba's total GNP .
And finally , the ability of Cuba to increase its annual economic growth rates
following the application of the American sanctions suggests further that the sanctions
failed to effectively harm the Cuban economy (see Graphs# 7 & 8). For , if the sanctions
had effectively influenced the Cuban economy, the economic harm incurred, would have,
"translated through the target state ' s (Cuba's) political system and into either policy
changes, regime changes," or ideological alterations. (Losman, 1979: 41 ). And, since
the economic harm incurred by the sanctions failed to force the ouster of Castro, the
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GRAPH 1: Foreign Trade of Cuba, 1957-1975
Source: (I) Mesa-Lago , C. (1979) . The economy and international economic relations . In Blasier , C. & MesaLago, C. (Eds.), Cuba in the World. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press . Pp. 169-198 .
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